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ABSTRACT
Quality assurance is an essential activity for any business interacting with
consumers. There are considerable number of projects going on to develop intrusion
detection systems (IDSs). However, efforts to establish standards and practices to
ensure the quality of such systems are comparatively less significant. The quality
assurance activities for IDSs should ensure the conformance of explicitly stated
functional and performance requirements as well as implicit characteristics that are
expected from information security tools.
This dissertation establishes guidelines to review, evaluate and possibly to
develop an IDS. To establish guidelines, generic IDS and software requirements,
software quality factors and design principles are used which are available in related
literature and these requirements are presented both on developed generic IDS model
and in Common Criteria Protection Profile format. First, the guidelines are developed,
then they are implemented on a specific IDS product evaluation.
vÖZ
Müşteri ile iletişim halinde bulunulan ve müşterilere ürün sunulan her iş
alanõnda, kalite güvence çalõşmalarõ önem kazanmaktadõr. Değişik işletim sistemleri için
kayda değer sayõda Nüfuz Tespit Sistem'i (NTS) geliştirme çalõşmasõ bulunmasõna
karşõn, bu sistemlerin kalitesini ortaya koyacak olan standartlarõn geliştirilmesine, aynõ
derecede önem verilmemektedir. NTSleri için kalite güvence faaliyetleri, ürüne özel
fonksiyonel ve performans gereksinimlerinin yerine getirildiğini ve aynõ zamanda genel
güvenlik araçlarõ için geçerli gereksinimlerin sağlandõğõnõ göstermelidir.
Bu tez çalõşmasõnda, bir NTSnin geliştirilmesi ve değerlendirilmesi için
kullanõlabilecek kõlavuzlar ortaya konulmuştur. Bu kõlavuzlarõn geliştirilmesi için, genel
NTSleri ve yazõlõm gereksinimleri, yazõlõm kalitesi ve geliştirme prensipleri hakkõndaki
mevcut literatür kullanõlmõştõr. Ortaya konulan gereksinimler, hem geliştirilen genel
NTS modeli üzerinde, hem de Genel Kriterler (Common Criteria) Koruma Profili
(Protection Profile) biçiminde sunulmuştur. Son olarak geliştirilen kõlavuzlar ve
gereksinimler, bir NTS ürününün değerlendirilmesi için kullanõlmõştõr.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
Before the internet age, networks were simpler and there were fewer threats.
A single knowledgeable network manager could check the security logs and look for
anomalies in those days. As networks grew, customers moved to automated solutions.
First came automated log checkers. Then agents are used to watch for suspicious
behavior. Every time a new attack was spotted the computer security industry responded
with new attack signatures. Networks are becoming complex, larger, more distributed
and have more access points, which result in more vulnerabilities. There is also more at
risk as companies rush to make valuable corporate assets available over networks and
business systems. Heavy reliance on computers and increased network connectivity
increased the risk of potential damage from attacks that can be launched from remote
locations. Not only the networks but also operating systems and applications are also
growing, becoming more powerful and complex. This complexity makes these
systems more likely to contain bugs, some of which can be exploitable by the attackers
to gain access to system and its data (Webster, 1998). Current security measures such as
firewalls, security policies, and encryption are not sufficient to prevent the compromise
of private computers and networks that a fundamentally new approach is called for.
(Das, 2000; Internet Security Systems, 1999).
Then, intrusion detection systems have become an essential component of
computer security to supplement existing defences. This field underwent explosive
growth in the last couple of years. Even after the several early releases, there still
remain at least seventeen extant products that claim to provide intrusion detection in a
networked environment (Internet Security Systems, 1999). However, standards for such
IDSs have not been established yet, though there are some on going projects. Thus, this
thesis aims to bring up high level standards for a generic IDS model monitoring a
computer system to detect and react to intrusions. A computer system may range from a
single computer to a network. An IDS performs following functions: collecting the
information regarding computer system activity, data [and vulnerabilities]; analysing
and reporting of the collected information, finally reacting detected intrusions.
2This thesis can be used basically by three groups of people: IDS consumers,
developers and evaluators. In order to see the requirements of an IDS and to select the
best-suited product to their organizational needs, consumers can refer to this prototype.
Consumers may prepare a simple checklist or use the one given in Appendix as well to
see the capabilities of available IDS products.
Developers can use this thesis to write the specifications of their IDS product
before the production phase. During and after the production phase they can apply to
this work to evaluate their product. Finally the thesis can be used by evaluators when
forming judgement about an IDS product. Note that this work does not give the
procedures to be followed in either evaluation or development phases.
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter 2 provides background
information about intrusion, intrusion detection, software quality assurance, client-
server architecture and the methodology followed in this thesis. Chapter 3 classifies and
documents the IDS requirements on developed generic IDS Model. Chapter 4 represents
IDS requirements in Common Criteria Protection Profile (PP) format. For this purpose a
draft IDS Protection Profile is written for sample LAN environment. This IDS PP is
implemented on a commercially available IDS called ISS RealSecure in Chapter 5.
Finally, in Chapter 6 conclusions and suggestions are provided for future work on
quality assurance and standardization of IDS.
Chapter 2 
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 Computer Intrusions
Many researchers define intrusion as "any set of action that attempts to
compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource" (Heady et al.
1990 as cited in Kumar, 1995; Lodin, 1999). Anderson (1980 as cited in Kumar, 1995)
uses threat with the same meaning and defines it as the potential possibility of
deliberate unauthorized attempt to access or manipulate information or to render a
system unreliable or unusable. In this thesis, the first definition is accepted. Based on
that approach, a computer intrusion is re-defined as any action attempting to break into
or misuse the computer system which may lead to loss of the integrity, confidentiality or
availability of a computer system resource.
A computer attack can be defined as the any malicious activity against the
computer system. Attacks can be trojan horses, viruses, actions aiming the denial of any
computer system service and even physical damages. According to above definitions,
intrusions are a subset of attacks. However, since this thesis focuses on the computer
intrusions, the terms "computer intrusion", "intrusion", also "computer attack" and
"attack" are used interchangeably to mean intrusion as it is defined above.
There are two types of potential intruders, outsiders and insiders (or legitimate
users). Outsiders are the most publicized form of intruders and mostly called as crackers
or hackers. They attack the computer system via networks. Inside intruders are
authorized users of the organization. Those people has potential for causing the greatest
damage on computer system because they have physical access, some level of genuine
privilege, knowledge about the location of the valuable data, the computer system and
its security mechanisms.
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
As their names imply, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are the systems that
attempt to detect intrusions and/or defend against them. IDSs react to the potential
attacks automatically. While these reactions can be warnings to the system security
4officer; they can also be recovery actions, defensive actions (e.g., shutting down the
attacked system service) or any combination of them. IDSs are based on the hypothesis
that monitoring and analyzing network transmissions, system audit records, application
audit records, system configuration, data files, and other information can detect
intrusions.
Generally speaking, current IDSs can be classified as either anomaly detectors
or misuse detectors (or both). Anomaly detectors are based on the observation of
deviations from normal usage/behavior. IDS stores the individual or group of
users'/subjects' normal behavior profiles and flags the actions deviating from these
profiles. These profiles are constructed from historical data collected over a period of
normal operation. By this method IDSs can catch the masquerading attacks where an
intruder logs into the computer system by someone else's password or the legitimate
users misusing their privileges. The disadvantage of this method is that it does not work
if the user's activity is not stable and/or is overlapping with attacker activity. If the user's
profiles is changing very fast and his/her actions are very similar to the an attacker's
(like system administrator's actions) then the anomaly detection system may not differ a
legitimate user and attacker or normal user activity and legitimate user's misusing
activity.
Anomaly detection includes following two basic measures and techniques. The
first one is threshold detection, in which certain attributes of user and system behavior
are expressed in terms of counts, with some level established as permissible. Such
behavior attributes can include but not limited to, the number of files accessed by a user
in a given period of time, the number of failed attempts to login to the system, the
amount of CPU utilized by a process.
The second one is statistical measures, both parametric, where the distribution of
the profiled attributes is assumed to fit a particular pattern, and non-parametric, where
the distribution of the profiled attributes is learned from a set of historical values,
observed over time. Other measures, including neural networks, genetic algorithms, and
immune system models are also available but they are not used in current IDSs in
general.
IDSs with misuse detectors "watches for the indications of specific, precisely re-
presentable techniques of computer system abuse" (Puketza et al. 1994). IDS watches
5the computer system and searches occurrence of these "signatures" that are stored as
known intrusion techniques. As only known intrusions are detected, IDS must be
constantly updated with signatures. Misuse detectors are effective at detecting attacks
without generating an overwhelming number of false alarms. They can quickly and
reliably diagnose the use of a specific attack tool or technique. This can help security
managers prioritize corrective measures.
These above approaches are major but there are some other techniques for
detection. Integrity checking is one of them. In this method IDS checks the integrity and
changes of the prior system files and configurations. If the critical and important system
files has been changed, IDS reacts.
For all above intrusion detection purposes most traditional IDSs have taken
either a network-based or a host-based approach. Network-based IDSs evaluate
information captured from network traffic. They analyze packets travelling across the
network. Network-based IDS comprise software that is installed on dedicated
workstations that are placed at critical junctions of a network (e.g., just outside a
firewall, in front of a Web server or in front of an e-mail server). They "sniff (capture
and read) the stream of IP packets travelling across the network. A few well-placed
network-based IDSs can monitor a large network. Deployment of network-based IDSs
has little impact upon an existing network but they may have difficulty processing all
packets in a large or busy network. Therefore, they may fail to recognize an attack
launched during periods of high traffic. Network-based IDSs are usually passive devices
that listen on a network wire without interfering with the normal operation of a network.
Thus, it is usually easy to retrofit a network to include network-based IDSs with
minimal effort (Schepers, 1998; Barber, 2001).
Host-based IDSs evaluate information found on some kind of host computer.
This may include contents of operating system, file system, applications, and perhaps,
other similar information. Host computers may include user workstations (including
specialized applications such as web browsers), peripherals (such as printers),
specialized servers such as web servers, or network components (such as firewalls,
routers, and switches). Host-based IDSs use software modules that are installed on each
monitored host. They access and read logs and audit records of interest (Lodin, 1999).
6Host-based IDSs, with their ability to monitor events local to a host, may detect
attacks that cannot be seen by a network-based IDS and they can often operate in an
environment in which network traffic is encrypted, when the host-based information
sources are generated before data is encrypted and/or after the data is decrypted at the
destination host. Host-based IDSs are comparatively harder to manage, as information
must be configured and managed for every host monitored and they can be disabled by
certain denial-of-service attacks. When host-based IDSs use operating system audit
trails as an information source, the amount of information can be immense, requiring
additional local storage on the system. Additionally, they use the computing resources
of the hosts they are monitoring, therefore inflicting a performance cost on the
monitored systems (Durst, et al. 1999).
Each approach, network and host-based, has its strengths and weaknesses, but
they are both complementary, and a truly effective IDS will employ both technologies
(Schepers, 1998).
2.3 Client Server Model
A large system or software can be decomposed into sub-systems and modules
according to service or function provided by them. The initial design process of
identifying these sub-systems and establishing a framework for sub-system control and
communication is called architectural design (Sommerville, 1995, p. 227).
Sommerville (1995) also states that architectural design usually comes before detailed
system specification and includes following activities:
• System structuring: The system is structured into a number of principal sub-systems
where a sub-system is an independent software unit. Communications between sub-
systems are identified.
• Control modelling: A general model of the control relationship between the parts of
the system is established.
• Modular decomposition: Each identified sub-system is decomposed into modules.
The types and interconnections between modules are defined.
Architectural design is based on a particular model in general. In this thesis
client-server model is used for system structuring. Typically, this allows a user program
at a host to act as a client issuing requests to programs and databases that may be
7located at many remote-computing sites. The major components of client-server model
are (Sommerville, 1995, p. 230):
• Set of stand-alone servers which provide specific services such as data and
management.
• Set of clients, which call on these services.
• Infrastructure/network which allows communication between clients and servers.
There are some specific implementations of client-server model. One of those
implementations is three-tier architecture, which is partially implemented in the Chapter
3 on generic IDS model. In a three-tier architecture, there are mainly three tiers; the user
interface (client), data management (server) components, and the third tier (middle tier
server) between the previous two tiers. This middle tier provides basically process
management by providing functions such as queuing, application execution, and
database staging.
A three-tier client/server architecture (Figure 2.1) includes user interfaces at top
tier where user services (such as session, text input, dialog, and display management)
reside. The third tier provides database management functionality and is dedicated to
data and file services. The middle tier provides process management services (such as
process development, process enactment, process monitoring, and process resourcing)
that are shared by multiple applications. The middle tier server (also referred to as the
application server) improves performance, flexibility, maintainability, reusability, and
Figure 2.1: Example Three Tier Client-server Architecture.
Top Tier: Clients (User
interfaces)
Middle Tier: Application
server.
Third Tier: Database
server.
8scalability by centralizing process logic. Centralized process logic makes administration
and change management easier by localizing system functionality so that changes must
only be written once and placed on the middle tier server to be available throughout the
systems (The Software Engineering Institute, 2002).
The most important advantage of client-server model is straightforward
distribution that may be also an advantage for IDSs because IDSs collect, analyze and
process some computer system and network data at different distributed locations and
hosts on the network. Thus, IDS model in Chapter 3 is based on client-server
architecture and some more details about this model will be given in that chapter.
2.4 Security Software Quality Assurance
While assurance is defined as grounds for confidence that a deliverable meets its
objectives, Software Quality Assurance (SQA) is defined as "a planned and systematic
approach to the evaluation of the quality of and adherence to software product
standards, processes, and procedures" (NASA-GB-A201, 1992). Additionally, in IEEE
Std 730-1998, quality assurance is defined as "a planned and systematic pattern of all
actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that the item or product conforms to
established technical requirements" (IEEE Std-730, 1998). SQA includes the process of
assuring that standards and procedures are established and are followed throughout the
software acquisition life cycle which involves three activities: management, engineering
and assurance which are illustrated in the Figure 2.2. Compliance with agreed-upon
standards and procedures is evaluated through process monitoring, product evaluation,
and audits where standards are the established criteria to which the software products
are compared and procedures are the established criteria to which the development and
control processes of a software are compared.
According to NASA Software Assurance Standard, the SQA process shall ensure that
(NASA-STD-2201-93, 1992):
! Standards and procedures for management, engineering, and assurance activities are
specified.
! Management, engineering, and assurance adhere to specified standards and
procedures.
! All documentation and report formats and content descriptions are defined.
9! All plans (configuration management, risk management, assurance plan,
management plan, etc.) are completed and implemented according to specified
standards and procedures.
! The configuration management process functions according to approved procedures
and that all baselined items are maintained under Configuration Management.
! Baseline control, configuration identification, configuration control, configuration
status accounting, and configuration authentication activities are carried out.
NASA Software Assurance Standard also states that the SQA process shall include the
following activities (NASA-STD-2201-93, 1992):
! Evaluation of specified standards and procedures.
! Audits of all management, engineering, and assurance processes, for example,
Configuration Management.
! Reviews of all project documentation including reports, schedules, and records.
! Monitoring of formal inspections and formal reviews.
! Monitoring/witnessing of formal and acceptance-level software testing.
These and any other quality assurance activities are performed to provide
adequate confidence that software product conforms to established technical
requirements. For this confidence, the requirements of an individual software should
have been developed first essentially.
There are series of efforts to develop criteria and set of requirements for
specifying and evaluating IT security requirements. In the early 1980s the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) was developed in the United States. In
Management
planning, controlling,
and directing
Engineering
analyzing requirements,
developing designing,
writing code
Assurance
assuring product &
processes
Figure 2.2: Software Acquisition Life Cycle.
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the succeeding decade, various countries began initiatives to develop evaluation criteria
that built upon the concepts of the TCSEC but were more flexible and adaptable to the
evolving nature of IT in general (Common Criteria Org.,2002b).
In Europe, the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
version 1.2 was published in 1991 by the European Commission after joint development
by the nations of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In
Canada, the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC)
version 3.0 was published in early 1993 as a combination of the ITSEC and TCSEC
approaches. In June 1993, the sponsoring organizations of the CTCPEC, FC, TCSEC
and ITSEC pooled their efforts and began a joint activity to align their separate criteria
into a single set of IT security criteria that could be widely used. This activity was
named the CC Project. As the outcome of this project "Common Criteria (CC);
Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology Security" was produced and recognized
by ISO as IS (International Standard) 15408 (Common Criteria Org., 2002a).
The Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology (IT) Security
Evaluation is a standard and basis for specifying and evaluating the security features of
computer products and systems especially security products/softwares. It provides a
common set of requirements for the security functions of IT products and systems and
the assurance measures. The CC supports the development of standardized sets of well
understood IT product security requirements by user communities in the form of
Protection Profiles (PPs) for use in procurements and advice to manufacturers.
Manufacturers can use similar sets of CC-based requirements to describe the security
capabilities of their products. These are called Security Targets (STs), which can then
be used as the basis for security evaluations of those products. Security evaluations are
formalized testing and analytic processes that use the CC to determine whether IT
products have been correctly developed to specification and whether they are effective
in countering the security problems as claimed. Users can integrate evaluated IT
products into their systems with increased confidence that their claimed security
features will operate as intended (Common Criteria Org., 1999a, 2002b).
2.4.1 Parts of the Common Criteria
The CC presents three main parts, called Introduction and General Model,
Security Functional Requirements, and Security Assurance Requirements, with distinct
11
but related content. These there parts of CC are introduced in the following sub-
sections. All the information about CC, its background, parts and usage, are compiled
from CC Part1 and documents available in Common Criteria official home page
(Common Criteria Org., 1999a, 1999d, 2002a, 2002b).
2.4.1.1 Part 1 - Introduction and General Model
Part 1 introduces the CC. It defines general concepts and principles of IT
security evaluation and presents a general model of evaluation. Part 1 also defines
constructs for expressing IT security objectives, for selecting and defining IT security
requirements, and for writing high-level specifications for products and systems. These
constructs are called Protection Profiles (PPs), Security Targets (STs) and packages (PP
is described in a later section). In addition, Part 1 describes the usefulness of each part
of the CC in terms of each of the target audiences.
2.4.1.2 Part 2 - Security Functional Requirements
Part 2 contains a catalogue of well-defined and understood security functional
requirements that are intended to be used as a standard way of expressing the security
requirements for IT products and systems. The catalogue is organized into classes,
families, and components.
• Classes are high-level groupings of families of requirements, all sharing a
common security focus (e.g., identification and authentication, auditing).
• Families are lower-level groupings of requirement components, all sharing
specific security objectives but differing in rigor or emphasis (e.g., user
authentication, audit data generation, audit analysis, audit review).
• Components are the lowest selectable requirements that may be included in PPs,
STs, or packages (e.g., unforgeable user authentication).
Part 2 also includes an extensive annex of application notes for applying the
material that it contains. While it is possible to explicitly state functional requirements
not included in the Part 2 catalog in building CC-based constructs (PPs, STs, and
packages), that is not advised unless it is clearly not practical to use Part 2 components.
Using functional requirements not part of the catalog could jeopardize widespread
acceptance of the result.
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2.4.1.3 Part 3 - Security Assurance Requirements
Security assurance requirements are grouped into classes. Classes are the most
general grouping of security requirements, and all members of a class share a common
focus. Eight assurance classes are contained within Part 3 of the CC. These are as
follows:
• Configuration
Management.
• Delivery and Operation.
• Development.
• Guidance Documents.
• Life Cycle Support.
• Tests.
• Vulnerability
Assessment.
• Assurance
Maintenance.
Each of these classes contains a number of families. The requirements within
each family share security objectives, but differ in emphasis or rigor. For example, the
Development class contains seven families dealing with various aspects of design
documentation (e.g. functional specification, high-level design and representation
correspondence).
The CC has provided seven predefined assurance packages, on a rising scale of
assurance, known as Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs). These provide balanced
groupings of assurance components that are intended to be generally applicable. The
seven EALs are as follows:
• EAL1 functionally tested
• EAL2- structurally tested
• EAL3 methodically tested and
checked
• EAL4 methodically designed,
tested and reviewed
• EAL5 semiformally designed and
tested
• EAL6 semiformally verified
design and tested
• EAL7 formally verified design and
tested
EAL1 is the entry level. Up to EAL4 increasing rigor and detail are introduced,
but without introducing significant specialized security engineering techniques. EAL4
can generally be applied to products and systems not developed with evaluation in
mind.
Above EAL4, the increasing application of specialized security engineering
techniques is required. TOEs meeting the requirements of these levels of assurance will
probably have been designed and developed with that objective. At the top level
(EAL7) there are significant limitations on the practicability of meeting the
requirements, partly due to substantial cost impact on the developer and evaluation
13
activities, and also because anything other than the simplest of products is likely to be
too complex to submit to state of the art techniques for formal analysis.
2.4.2 Protection Profile and Common Criteria Usage
The CC is used in two general ways:
• As a standardized way to describe security requirements, e.g., PPs and STs for
IT products and systems; and
• As a sound technical basis for evaluating the security features of these products
and systems (Common Criteria Org., 1999a)
The CC defines three useful constructs for putting IT security requirements from
Parts 2 and 3 together: the PP, the ST, and the package. The CC has been developed
around the central notion of using in these constructs, wherever possible, the security
requirements in Parts 2 and 3 of the CC, which represent a well-known and understood
domain.
The PP is an implementation-independent statement of security needs for a set
of IT security products (such as Firewalls, IDSs) that could be built. The PP contains a
set of security requirements, preferably taken from the catalogues in Parts 2 and 3,
which should include an EAL. A PP is intended to be a reusable definition of product
security requirements that are known to be useful and effective.
A PP could be developed by user communities, IT product developers, or other
parties interested in defining such a common set of requirements. A PP gives consumers
a means of referring to a specific set of security needs and communicating them to
manufacturers. The PP also helps future product evaluation against those needs.
The PP contains the following items:
• PP introduction - identification and overview information, which allows users to
identify PPs useful to them.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE) description - description of the IT product and its
purpose, not necessarily from a security perspective.
• TOE security environment - description of the security aspects of the
environment in which the product is intended to be used and the manner in
which it is expected to be employed. This statement includes the following:
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• Assumptions about the security aspects of the products expected usage
and operating environment, such as value of assets and limitations of use.
Assumptions also describe the environments physical, personnel, and
connectivity aspects.
• Threats against which the product or its supporting environment must
specifically provide protection.
• Organizational security policies or rules with which the product must
comply. These can be any explicit statements of IT security needs that
the product must meet.
• Security objectives - a high-level statement of what the product and its
environment are intended to accomplish in covering the threats, policies, and
assumptions.
• IT security requirements - the detailed statement of IT security functional and
assurance requirements that the product and its operating environment must
satisfy to meet the objectives.
• Application notes - additional supporting information that may be useful for the
construction, evaluation, or use of the product.
• Rationale - the evidence describing how the PP is complete and cohesive and
how a product built against it would be effective in meeting the objectives.
2.5 Methodology
There are some different ways of organizing the content of software requirement
specification suggested by some US governmental and standardization organizations
such as Department of Defense DI-MCCR-80025A, NASAs SFW-DID-08 and
IEEE/ANSI 830 (Davis, 1990). The following basic requirement titles and content are
common mostly for the above standards:
• Functional Requirements: Functional requirements should define the fundamental
actions that must take place in the software in accepting and processing the inputs
and in processing and generating the outputs. These are generally listed as "shall"
statements starting with "The system shall" (IEEE Std 830, 1998)
! Functions- description of all operations, functions should be flagged.
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! Inputs- definition of inputs: specify sources of inputs, types, formats, units of
measure, timing, and ranges of valid inputs, including accuracies and
tolerances, disposition of illegal values, error messages.
! Outputs- definition of outputs: specify destinations of outputs, units of
measure, timing, range of valid outputs, including accuracies and tolerances,
disposition of illegal values, error messages.
! Data Handling- requirements for database or dictionary.
• Security Requirements: Specification of the factors that protect the software from
accidental or malicious access, use, modication, destruction, or disclosure. Specific
requirements in this area could include the need to
! Utilize certain cryptographic techniques;
! Keep log or history data sets;
! Assign certain functions to different modules;
! Restrict communications between some areas of the program;
! Check data integrity for critical variables.
• Performance Requirements: Specification of each performance requirement in
testable and quantitative terms. The following should be addressed:
! Timing and sizing requirements.
! Sequence and timing of events, including user interaction tolerances.
! Throughput and capacity requirements.
! Error detection, isolation, and recovery requirements for data and processes.
! Fail-safe requirements.
• External Requirements:
! Interfaces. User, hardware, software, and communications interfaces. The
purpose, requirements (e.g., performance, safety, security), and
implementation constraints for each interface. For example, requirements for
user interface may include screen descriptions and report descriptions.
! Environment. Operating conditions.
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• Assurance Requirements: The assurance requirements may prove specified
requirements, functions are achieved by the product. They may include
development, documentation, delivery and installation, management requirements
Some parts of above content are included in this thesis also. On the other hand,
they are not presented in ordered and title-by-title format as stated above but using
developed IDS model and Common Criteria Protection Profile format (which is
explained in previous section). The methodology given below is followed for specifying
and representing the requirements of IDSs:
" First, a generic IDS model and requirements were tried to be achieved. For this
purpose the sub-step specified below were followed:
# Available IDS literature and products were searched. Common
specifications, requirements and models for IDSs were extracted.
# A generic IDS model in client-server architecture was developed which is
based on the available literature and products. While developing this model
generic IDS needs were tried to be answered.
# Individual requirements of the modules were specified on developed model
at abstract level. This specification was achieved module by module. Then,
the concatenate requirements for IDSs were specified under System
Requirements title, including the subtitles such as development, installation,
configuration.
" An IDS Protection Profile was written specific to PC LAN environment. For this
purpose, CC PP development methodology (Common Criteria Org., 1999a;
ISO/IEC JTC, 1999), illustrated in Figure 2.3, was followed and previously
developed IDS model and requirements in this thesis were also used as the basis for
this PP. Below sub-steps were followed in order to develop PP:
# First of all, the selected working environment (Izmir Institute of Technology
Department of Computer Engineering, PC Laboratory/PcLab) was focused
on and its specifications were extracted (assets, physical environment).
# Then assumptions and threats for this environment were defined according
to its specs.
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# At next step, security objectives (OPG for IDS product group specific for this
environment) that are the intended response to assumptions and threats were
defined.
# Security requirements addressing those objectives were written. At this step,
CC Part2 and IDS requirements were used. CC Part2 is used as a
requirement catalogue, the needed requirements were restated from this
catalogue after the allowed modifications. In addition to the available
requirement classes in the CC Part 2, a new proposed class was written for
intrusion detection systems (see Appendix D). For this purpose, existing CC
classes especially Security Audit class (FAU) was used as the model and
basis for new written security requirement class. Assurance requirements
Figure 2.3: IDS Requirement and PP Development Methodology.
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including testing, configuration, development requirements were directly
retstated from CC Part3.
# At last, rationale part was added which shows internal consistency between
assumptions, threats, objectives and requirements.
At all steps of PP development, other evaluated and validated security product
PPs and Security Targets (STs) were used as the formal model such as Firewall-1
Version 4.0 Security Target V2.4. The methodology explained above is illustrated in
Figure 2.3 and this methodology is common and applicable to other IT products PP
development processes.   
Chapter 3 
GENERIC INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM MODEL AND
REQUIREMENTS
In this chapter a model of IDS will be introduced that the model helps visualize
the functionality of IDS and its components more clearly. This model has a client/server
architecture composed of graphical user interface (GUI), management server (MS),
database server (DS) and intrusion detection module (IDM) which has two portions
called collector and analyzer.
In Figure 3.1, this generic IDS model is presented. According to the model,
security administrator controls the IDS through GUI that only communicates with
management server and it is not directly connected to the other IDS portions. GUI is the
display of intrusion detection system information that appears/is installed on system
administrator's computer. All management, configuration, response, reporting and other
possible jobs related to management are centralized on management server.
Configuration and policies are defined and implemented at a central management server
IDS
Graphical User Interface
Database Server
Management Server
Collector Analyzer
Target
Computer
System
-Network Log
-Audit Records
-System / Event Log
-Application Log
-Alerts from IDSs
Intrusion Detection Module
Figure 3.1: Intrusion Detection System Model.
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through GUI, each intrusion detection module downloads and applies its individual
policy. This centralized client/server architecture allows first, transparency between
GUI and other IDS portions (IDM, database) from users point of view; second,
controlling the many remote IDS components from many other remote points by
accessing only a single management server. On the other hand, that should be noted, in
complex systems many number of management servers can work on different
computers in a distributed and synchronous way.
Another IDS component, database server, stores all the short and long-term
information available on the IDS. That information may comprise assets in the IDS, IDS
policies, configurations, alerts, events, analysis results and collected/pre-processed
computer system and network data that can be used by analyzer. Although intrusion
detection modules can reach the database directly, a user only sees the information
presented by management server. For instance, when a user wants to get an event report
from GUI, GUI connects to the management server and handles this request.
Management server processes the request and produces the report from the data in the
database, finally it sends the output back to the GUI.
As mentioned before, the assets information, policies and configurations of the
assets are also stored in the database, but intrusion detection modules can not reach their
policies directly. When any policy or any configuration is changed/modified by the
administrator, IDM sends the "update" signal to all related modules, once they get the
"update" signal then they can download their necessary information through
management server. This architecture may have some benefits. For example, in this way
intrusion detection modules can be grouped according to their specifications and
management server can supply the group policy in which intrusion detection module
belongs to. This can make management relatively easier.
The last part of the model is intrusion detection module, which consists of two
sub-modules. The first one, named collector, collects the necessary data from the target
computer system or network. These data can be both pre-processed data by another
security tool or the raw data such as network packets, audit records, computer system /
event log, application log and so on. According to data collected they will be filtered,
processed and put into a common format that analyzer can understand. Again according
to the data type, collected and pre-processed data can be either sent to analyzer for
short-term analysis or stored in the database for long-term analysis or both.
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The second one, called analyzer, gets the collected data from either database or
collector(s) directly and performs various types of analysis such as statistical and rule-
based methods to detect any possible intrusion. When it detects an intrusion, it sends the
pre-defined alert to management console and also stores the pre-defined attributes of
detected event on the database.
After above overview of the model, in the following subsections the IDS
components requirements will be introduced.
3.1 Graphical User Interface
GUI addresses the type of interface provided to the intrusion detection system
administrator for configuration, monitoring and administrating both IDS and computer
system. The user interface is a key feature of any intrusion detection system, as it
provides the administrator with a window into the system for configuration, operation,
and maintenance (Amoroso and Kwapniewski, 1998).
! All necessary operations should be performed from within [preferably multiple] user
interfaces from which an administrator can remotely control, operate and view any
component of the intrusion detection system and any available information on the
system by connecting and using the management server functionalities as a client.
! Other IDS components should continue to work if the systems user interface is
disconnected, disabled, or experiences denial of service (Lodin, 1999).
! Any tools that can reasonably operate in background mode should be transparent to
the user to the extent possible (LaPadula, 1997).
! GUI should be able to graphically display the following things and should allow
configuring them: Modules available in the IDS, management window, reports,
detected intrusions, policies, configuration options and optionally the other
components of computer system and network such as firewalls or switches.
3.2 Management Server
All administrative and management functionalities of IDS are centralized at
Management Server which is equivalent to middle tier in three-tier client server
architecture. The requirements of Management Server are detailed in this section.
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! Management server (MS) controls all the other IDS components. This control
includes adding new components, starting and stopping the components, changing
their configuration and other possible operations done on the IDS.
! MS supplies policies and configurations to the other IDS components. When any
change/modification occurs related to IDS modules it sends notification signal to the
related modules and they update this change.
! MS answers the connection and service requests of the IDS components and allows
the connection if the component is in the asset database (For the details of asset
database see database server section 3.3.).
! MS should allow configuration of the IDS via graphical user interface to perform
intrusion detection based on the misuse detection, anomaly intrusion detection
model or any other technique used in IDS (Metcalf and LaPadula, 2000).
! MS should be able to supply all the information in the database to the GUI.
! MS should have human-understandable report generation capability based on the
data stored in the database (Barber, 2001).
! Reports may include description of suspected intrusions based on recorded intrusion
data, percentages of the intrusion types and points, network loads, and any other
data can be obtained from database selectively.
! Reports should be flexible, extensible, printable, configurable and exportable to
different formats, such as text or html.
! MS gets all intrusion alarms coming from the intrusion detection modules available
in the asset database. Depending on the policy, it reacts to the intrusion and it sends
the display information when any GUI connects to itself.
! The reaction could be the alerts graded according to their seriousness. These alerts
should have capability to be activated via different notification channels to different
alert destinations, such as e-mail to administrator, alert lines on user-interface and
reports. All recorded information about the intrusion should be included in the alert.
! Responses to events should include the ability to deny, degrade, disturb and deceive
the intruder, to reconfigure computer systems and information functions and to
counterattack. MS should have the capability to initiate those responses
automatically such as reporting, closure of session, resetting the connection. Those
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automated responses should be selected from predetermined list of responses
(Metcalf and LaPadula, 2000) or created by administrator.
3.3 Database Server
As the third tier of client-server model the database server provides storage
functionality to the intrusion detection systems. Although the third party developers
supply database servers in general, the database server and its requirements are stated as
a part of generic IDS model.
! Database server (DS) should allow connection requests from the pre-defined
intrusion detection modules and management server with authentication.
! DS store the information about the IDS components/assets (asset database).
! DS should store the data collected by the collector for defined period of time (audit
database).
! DS should store intrusion information produced by analyzer for defined period of
time (intrusion database).
! DS should store the policies (policy database).
! The database should have sorting, querying, and backup capabilities.
! The database ideally should be a commercially available off-the-shelf system
(LaPadula, 1997).
! DS should send an alarm if the storage capacity has been reached (Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 2000).
! Exporting the data to external database capability should exist (Lodin, 1999).
! Asset database should store at least the following attributes of IDS modules:
Table 3.1: Asset Database Table (cont. on next page).
Attributes Description
Module ID Identification number.
Module name Optional, user-friendly name.
Module type A unique name or number defining the type of module.
Host name or IP address Host name or IP address of the host on which IDS module is installed.
Policy ID Identification number of the policy applied.
Control port number Used by MS for controlling the module.
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Table 3.1: Asset Database Table (cont.).
Attributes Description
Communication port Pot number used by analyzer and collector to communicate with each other.
Database port number Port number used for communicating with database.
3.4 Intrusion Detection Module
Detection job is performed by Intrusion Detection Module. This module
includes two main sub-systems called, Collector and Analyzer. In this section, generic
functional requirements of these modules are defined.
! An intrusion detection module should include at least a collector and an analyzer or
a single module doing their jobs specified below.
! IDM should connect and download its policy from management server periodically
and/or when an update directive comes from MS.
3.4.1 Collector
! Collector should be able to collect the specified information from the targeted
computer system resource(s) or network for specified period of time according to its
type and policy.
! There can be various types of collectors, which are able to collect information from
multiple operating systems, networks and multiple platforms (hosts, switches,
routers, etc.) at several locations within the network (LaPadula, 1997; Metcalf and
LaPadula, 2000).
! Collector should process the collected information. Then it should store them in the
database or send to the analyzer or both. Processing stage should involve filtering
the data and converting it into the format that is understandable by the analyzer.
! The collected data may include start-up and shutdown, identification and
authentication events, data accesses, service requests, network traffic and other
specifically defined events such as alerts generated by other IDSs. The details
should be collected are shown in Table 3.2. Default attributes for the events are as
follows; Event ID, Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and
the outcome (success or failure). When host-based events are collected, for the
identification and authentication event, the source address could be a subject IDS on
a local machine and the destination is defined by default. For the data access and
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data introduction events, the source address could be file name and the destination
address may be target location for the file
Table 3.2: Events Table (SAIC, 2000).
Event Additional Attributes of the Event
Start-up and shutdown None
Identification and authentication requests User identity,
location,
source address,
destination address
Data accesses Object IDS,
requested access,
source address,
destination address
Service requests Specific service,
source address,
destination address
Network traffic Protocol,
source address,
destination address,
source port, destination port,
data portion of the packet
Security configuration changes Source address,
destination address
New data creation Object IDS,
location of object,
source address,
destination address
Audit function start-up and shutdown None
! According to intrusion detection technique, additional tuples/attributes can be
collected for the events, such as resource usage, CPU time or I/O units used
(Internet Security Systems, 1999).
3.4.2 Analyzer
! Analyzer should get data, which will be analyzed, from the DS or the collector.
! Analyzer should perform at least one of the following analysis methods on supplied
data: anomaly detection, misuse detection, integrity checking and other analytical
method according to its type and policy.
• Anomaly analysis involves identifying deviations from normal patterns of
behavior. For example, it may involve mean frequencies and measures of
variability to identify abnormal usage.
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• Misuse analysis involves the use of patterns corresponding to known attacks or
misuses of a computer system. For example, patterns of computer system
settings and user activity can be compared against a database of known attacks.
• Integrity analysis involves comparing computer system settings or user activity
at some point in time with those of another point in time to detect unexpected
differences.
! Analyzer should respond when intrusion is discovered. It sends an alarm to the
management server and stores the data in database.
! Analyzer should store the data shown in Table 3.3 about the detected intrusion in the
intrusion database. The other available data about the event (shown in Table 3.2)
should be added to Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Intrusion Database Table.
Attribute Description
Intrusion ID
Timestamp Detection date and time
Intrusion type This can be an ID number if an intrusion type database exists. Otherwise, the name
of the intrusion type and a short description of intrusion.
Priority Shows the importance of detected intrusion.
Event ID The ID number of the last event that caused this intrusion alert.
Module ID ID of the module, which detects the intrusion.
3.5 System Requirements
IDS requirements which, are common for all modules of IDS model, are
represented in this section. These requirements have following sub-groups,
development; installation, deployment and update capability; configuration;
performance; testing and documentation. Most of the requirements in this section are
valid for and applicable to not only IDSs but also other software products.
3.5.1 Development
There are some common standardized requirements on software development,
which are valid for not only IDS but also all the software products. In this section, only
some basic software development related requirements are listed.
! The developer should provide functional specification and the high-level design of
the IDS (Common Criteria Org., 1999c).
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! The high-level design should describe the structure of the IDS in terms of modules
and security functionality and functional specification of each module as being done
in the IDS model.
! Software verification and validation (V&V) activities should be followed and
documented which ensures that IDS satisfies functional and other requirements.
! V&V activities shall be performed during each phase of the software life cycle and
shall include analysis of system and software requirements allocation, verifiability,
testability, completeness, and consistency (NASA-STD-2201-93, 1992).
! Process and product standards, which lead to high quality, should be defined or
selected. These standards should be followed and applied by the software
development team. Product standards define characteristics that all product
components should exhibit; process standards define how the software development
process should be conducted (IEEE, 1999; NASA-STD-2201-93, 1992; Schultz,
2000; Sommerville, 1996). Basic software engineering standards and their coverage
are presented in the appendix.
! The developer should provide a security policy model for the IDS and should
demonstrate correspondence between the functional specification and the security
policy model (Common Criteria Org., 1999c).
3.5.2 Installation, Deployment and Update Capability
This section denotes criteria about the installation, deployment and updates of
the IDS.
! IDS should support generally used existing operating systems such as
Windows2000, Linux or Solaris, computer system and network infrastructure such
as Ethernet (Lodin, 1999).
! IDS should be installed quickly and easily without any delay or central points of
failure to the network or host being monitored.
! IDS should be scalable such that IDS or its modules should be able to be installed
on several number of hosts. This group of hosts should work as a single logical IDS.
This structure should allow the balance and distribution of workload and error
handling (ISA Server2000, 2000).
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! IDS should warn the mis-installation that can cause a system security hole or low
performance (ISA Server2000, 2000).
! IDS should be able to be updated with new intrusion signatures or any other product
updates automatically or manually via any secure way such as a secure encrypted
internet connection or a CD-ROM (Dragon 5, 2002, Norton Antivirus, 2002).
! The IDS should remind periodical updates automatically (Norton Antivirus, 2002).
! Vendor should notify the security officer about the availability of new non-
periodical updates (Internet Security Systems, 2000).
3.5.3 Configuration
The underlying working environment of IDSs can change from organization to
organization and/or from day to day in the same organization as well. In addition to that,
new threats are appearing every day. Thats why configuration has an important role for
adapting the changing work-environment and increasing the performance of IDSs. An
assortment of requirements addressing the configuration is stated in this section.
! IDS should allow at least configuration of below items and any other specification
improving the detection and usage capability of IDS.
• Detection technique: Selecting the intrusion detection technique to be applied.
• Numerical values: Tuning detection threshold levels or any other numerical
detection values according to detection technique.
• Detection rules: Selecting and creating attack signatures.
• Responses: Selecting or creating the responses for detected intrusions.
• Managed modules: Adding and removing managed modules by the MS.
Defining the locations of the modules.
• Database: Adding and removing users, defining database roles, deleting certain
or all attributes in the tables, clearing the database.
• Data: Changing the content of the collected and stored data.
• Policy: Selecting, creating and applying the security policies.
• Reports: Changing the format and including of reports.
• Ports: Specifying the communication ports of modules.
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• Paths: Specifying paths for reports, configurations, policies, encryption keys and
any other needed file.
• Encryption options: Selecting the encryption technique and specifying the key.
• Update: Selecting, enabling and disabling the update way.
! IDS should have configuration and policy templates that guide the user. These
templates should be customized and applied by the security officer (Internet
Security Systems, 2000).
! IDS should warn mis-configurations that can cause a system security hole or low
performance (ISA Server2000, 2000).
3.5.4 Performance
The primary performance metric for an IDS is the intrusion detection rate
according to most of the studies (Durst, et al. 1999; Lippmann, et al. 1998; Lippmann,
et al. 1999; Puketza, et al. 1994). This metric can be defined as the ratio between
number of detected intrusions and the number of intrusions, which can be counted in a
test-bed laboratory environment.
However, intrusion detection rate is insufficient when considered alone. It must
be combined with false alarm rates for normal traffic. False alarm rate can be defined as
the number of false intrusion alarms for a period of time such as a day. High false alarm
rates such as above hundreds per day, make an IDS excessively unusable, even with
high intrusion detection rate because, false alarms require assessment and dismissing
operation done by system security officer and this operation increases the human
workload. Low false alarm rates combined with high detection rates are desired, and
mean that alerts and so IDS can be trusted.
Other common software performance metrics are also considerable such as
traffic handling capacity, run-time memory and CPU usage (Amoroso and
Kwapniewski, 1998; Durst, et al. 1999; Lippmann, et al. 1998; Lippmann, et al. 1999;
Puketza, et al. 1994; Puketza, et al. 1995).
These metrics can have different relative values and importance, at different
computer systems and networks under different working conditions. For example, a
broad detection range may not be necessary if the IDS monitors a site that is protected
by other security mechanisms and tools (Puketza, et al. 1994) or false alarm rates may
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be lower, if a firewall might block most network traffic, and reduce the load on the
network. Economy in resource usage may not be required at a computer system and
network where security has a high priority and where computing resources exceed user
needs. Resilience to increasing load may be less important for a computer system and
network where users can not monopolize resources and not increase system load. Thus,
importance of the performance requirements is relative; they may change and be
identified accordingly.
! IDS should function without using too much system resource such as main memory,
CPU time disk space (Puketza, et al. 1994).
! IDS's detection capabilities should not be diminished as load increased (Barber,
2001). Load increase can be the increase in the number of packets travelling on the
network for a time interval, the number of hosts to be observed or the number of
users on a host. Detection capabilities can be defined in terms of false alarms per
day, detection rates.
! Increasing the number of attack signatures should not significantly impact the
detection capabilities of IDS (Internet Security Systems, 2000).
! Collecting the information, monitoring, scanning the system should not have
noticeable effect on normal the computer system and network operations (Metcalf
and LaPadula, 2000).
! IDS should minimize detection and reaction time required for real-time systems.
3.5.5 Testing
Software testing is a critical element of software quality assurance and
represents the ultimate review of specification, design, and coding (Pressman, 1994).
Testing of a software starts from development phase such as low-level tests that are
necessary to verify that even a small source code segment has been correctly
implemented; to the end product such as high-level tests that validate major software
functional requirements. Software testing strategies, methodologies and metrics are
detailly explained in many number of researches and books (Information Processing
Ltd, 1996a; Information Processing Ltd, 1996b; Pointe Technology Group, Inc., 2000;
Pressman, 1994). In this section, basic high-level test requirements and metrics are
introduced for an IDS.
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! IDS should be tested by its developer.
! Requirements defined in this chapter, all the requirements and specifications of the
product, and additionally other possible common software requirements such as
reliability, maintainability, portability, correctness, completeness, easy of use and
simplicity (Williams et al. 1998) should be checked during the tests even starting
from the delivery and installation.
! The performance metrics and requirements specified in section 3.5.4 should be
tested and documented. These metrics should include at least the system resource
usage, intrusion detection rates, and false alarms rates under different levels of
workload.
! The testing methodology can be based on simulating the real computer system and
network with users -both intruders as well as normal users while IDS is running. In
the simulation, IDS should be tested by the simulated attacks to the computers in the
test bed/laboratory under the simulated working conditions near to real-world
conditions (Amoroso and Kwapniewski, 1998; Lippmann, et al. 1998; Lippmann, et
al. 1999; Puketza, et al. 1994).
! Following possible reliability parameters should be tested (Pressman, 1994;
Sommerville, 1996):
• Availability: Specify the percentage of time available, hours of use, maintenance
access, degraded mode operations, and so on.
• Mean Time Between Failures: This can be specified in hours, days or months.
• Mean Time to Repair: Out of operation time after the fail.
• Maximum Bugs or Defect Rate: Expressed in terms of bugs per thousand of
lines of code (bugs/KLOC) or bugs per function-point(bugs/function-point).
• Bugs or Defect Rate: Categorized in terms of minor, significant, and critical
bugs. For example, a critical bug can be complete loss of data or a complete
inability to use certain parts of the systems functionality.
! The test results should show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of
the tests. The test results should demonstrate that each function operates as specified
(Common Criteria Org., 1999c).
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3.5.6 Documentation
Documentation may include many kinds of documents such as reports,
development products, delivery procedures, and user guides. Complexity, architecture
and some features of a product may affect the amount of documentation a product
should need. Also some documents may be presented together as a single document
such as installation, guidance and configuration. For example, the design
documentation may consist of a single document describing both the system
architecture and the detailed modules or it may consist of separate documents for the
architecture and sub-systems (Wallace et al 1994). The purpose of this section is to
identify the basic content and requirements of documentation needed for an IDS.
! The developer should provide at least the documents below in both hard and soft
media.
• Development: Describing high-level design with functional specifications.
• Delivery: Describing all procedures to maintain secure distribution of the IDS,
its updates or other deliveries to the user.
• Installation: Describing procedures for the installation, generation, and start-up
of the IDS.
• Guidance: Describing all modules functions, modes of operation, specifications
and usage.
• Intrusions: Describing the known intrusions, including their name, type, effect,
method and other possible information about the intrusion.
• Configuration: Describing how IDS is configured and configuration
specifications.
• Testing: Describing test plans, test procedure & methodology descriptions,
expected test results and actual test results.
! The documentation should be complete, clear, consistent and well organized (Lodin,
1999).
! The documentation format should fit the common documentation standards
developed by IEEE or ISO (see Appendix B for documents covered by each
organization).
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! On-line and off-line helps that are integrated with GUI should be supplied. Help
should include all the installation, guidance and configuration items defined above.
3.5.7 Security
These requirements focus on the degree to which the intrusion detection system
protects itself from malicious security attack. Techniques such as encryption and access
control are typical controls used to ensure the security given below (Amoroso and
Kwapniewski, 1998):
! All modules of IDS should ensure trusted communications between themselves; for
example, an analyzer should authenticate itself to the management server and vice
versa (Metcalf and LaPadula, 2000).
! All communication between the IDS modules should be encrypted (Amoroso and
Kwapniewski, 1998; Lodin, 1999; Metcalf and LaPadula, 2000; Dragon 5, 2002)
! IDS should require user authentication before allowing any operation.
! IDS should log the operations performed.
! IDS should monitor its own activities for signs of interference, failure or intrusions,
and is capable of responding when such signs are found (Jackson, 1999).
! IDS should be capable to check and verify the integrity of the transmitted and stored
data by using digital signatures, MD5 checksum or any other way (Jackson, 1999;
NetSonar100, 2001).
! All security mechanisms of IDS should be self-contained and does not require pre-
existing security infrastructure such as public key infra structure (HP IDS/9000,
2001).
Chapter 4 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM PROTECTION PROFILE FOR
PC LABORATORY LAN ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Protection Profile Introduction
This chapter of thesis is written in the Common Criteria (CC) Protection Profile
(PP) format, on the other hand in some sections some additional explanatory parts are
added for the reader who is not familiar with CC.
This introductory section presents PP identification information and a brief
discussion of the PP.
This PP is developed for an Intrusion Detection System for PC Laboratory LAN
Environment and it can be stated as Target of Evaluation (TOE) in the rest of this
chapter according to CC terminology.
4.1.1 Identification
Title: Intrusion Detection System Protection Profile for PC Laboratory LAN
Environment
Keywords: intrusion detection, network, security, protection profile, LAN.
4.1.2 Overview
Following topics should be covered in this Overview section of PP: the targeted
IDS, and PC Laboratory LAN environment, function of this IDS, its structure and
working principles overview in abstract level. The developed and previously mentioned
IDS model can be summarized and restated directly here.
4.2 Target of Evaluation Description
4.2.1 Architecture and Working Principles
Modules in the IDS model, their functions, and interactions should be explained
here. Target of Evaluation is explained again in much more detail than the PP
Overview section. IDS Model can be used in this section too.
4.2.2 Scope and Boundaries of the Target of Evaluation
This section provides a general description of the physical and logical scope and
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boundaries of the TOE.
The TOE configuration consists of one physical component/host including for
PcLab LAN environment:
• One computer with operating system and database server, which are integrated with
TOE.
• Two network interfaces.
• One graphical user interface (GUI), one management server (MS), and one intrusion
detection module (IDM) which has three portions two collectors and one analyzer.
Software and hardware features outside the scope of the defined TOE Security
Functions (TSF) are as follows: client and session authentication between modules,
interaction with other products such as database servers, and remote administration.
These are out of the scope of TOE because the TOE is not maintained in a distributed
way in PcLab environment.
4.3 Target of Evaluation Security Environment
The IDS PP is prepared for the LAN environment, which is similar to the İzmir
Institute of Technology, Department of Computer Engineering, PC Laboratory (PcLab).
All assumptions, threats and objectives stated in the IDS PP rely on this PcLab LAN
environment. Therefore, the following explanatory part about the PcLab is needed to
make the PP clearer.
This PcLab is serving to 100's of computer engineering students who are using
common applications and services including but not limited to, sending and receiving e-
mails, using FTP to send and receive files, accessing other computers via telnet
sessions, browsing web pages, and compiling and running the programs. These user
actions can be simply based on the following services and protocols: http, smtp, pop3,
ftp, irc, telnet, X, SQL/telnet, dns, finger, and snmp.
In this laboratory, there are 32 computers with Win2000, Win98 and Linux
operating systems inter-connected through an ethernet network (Figure 4.1). There are
29 computers for students' usage. These computers are indicated as Pc(1:n) in Figure
4.1. All Win98 machines are working stand-alone so they do not make any password
authentication from any server. On the other hand, Linux machines are using NIS and
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NFS services for authentication and mounting the home directories of the users from
Linux Server. So all Linux users are defined on the Linux Server. Client Linux
machines get user specific information including groups, passwords, and settings from
Linux Server. Student PCs are connected to the internet via Linux Server and then
through Firewall. So while the Linux Server is the gateway for the student PCs, Firewall
is the gateway for all computers in the lab.
Network based IDS is sniffing network packets from both hubs in the lab in
order to detect intrusions from both internal and external networks.
IDS, Firewall and Linux Server machines have dual ethernet cards as a result of
jobs they are performing. The other specifications of computers available in PC Lab are
shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: PcLab Specification Summary (cont. on next page).
Student PCs Function: Student usage.
O/S: Redhat 7.0 Linux and Win98
Total number: 29
Supplied Services: Common user applications such as compilers, browsers, telnet,
ftp and e-mail programs.
Physical Access: Only Computer Eng. Students.
Figure 4.1: PcLab Topology.
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Table 4.1: PcLab Specification Summary (cont.).
Linux Server Function: Server, gateway.
O/S: Redhat 7.2 Linux
IP: Dual Ethernet; (Student PCs side, Firewall side)
Supplied Services:
WEB (for experimental purposes),
FTP (anonymous access enabled),
TELNET,
NIS,
NFS,
SAMBA servers,
Common user applications.
Physical Access: Only administrator.
IDS Function: Intrusion detection.
O/S: Win2000 (only administrator, no user account)
IP: Dual Ethernet (Student PCs side, Firewall side)
Supplied Services:
Only O/S and IDS services,
No any file or source sharing.
Physical Access: Only administrator.
Firewall Function: Firewall, Gateway.
O/S: Win2000.
IP: Dual Ethernet (Internet side, Linux Server side).
Supplied Services:
Firewall management,
Windows network file sharing,
TELNET,
FTP (anonymous access enabled).
Physical Access: Only administrator.
The laboratory is administered by computer engineering department research
assistants who know all administrative passwords in the laboratory. Those research
assistants also control the physical access to the laboratory during the office hours
(09:00-17:00). The laboratory is locked out of the office hours. On the other hand,
students can study at PcLab out of the office hours by taking the permission from
research assistants. In that case, the permitted students can study at the lab without any
administration and the names of these students are logged according to date. The PcLab
is locked again by Security Personnel at the end of this extra studying period. The
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Security Personnel is available at the entrance of the building for 24 hours and this
person is responsible for keeping the lab doors locked out of the office hours.
As seen from the above explanations about PcLab, this laboratory has common
specifications for LAN environments so this PP could be applicable to similar LAN
environments.
4.3.1 Assumptions
In this section, following types of assumptions are included that are valid for
PcLab LAN operational environment:
• Physical protection of any part of the TOE.
• Personnel aspects (e.g. the types of user roles anticipated, their general
responsibilities, and the degree of trust assumed to be placed in those users).
• Connectivity aspects (e.g. a firewall being configured as the only network
connection between a private network and a hostile network).
• Underlying system aspects.
Almost all the assumptions are quoted from Traffic-Filter Firewall PP
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2000) and modified according to existing PcLab
environment conditions.
4.3.1.1 Physical Assumptions
A.PROTECT The TOE is assumed to be physically protected from unauthorised
modification by potentially hostile outsiders.
4.3.1.2 Personnel Assumptions
A.ADMIN It is assumed that one or more non-hostile authorised
administrators are assigned who are competent to manage the TOE
and the security of the information it contains, and who can be
trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as to undermine
security and follow all administrator guidance; however, they are
capable of error.
A.ATTACK Attackers are assumed to have a high level of resources and
motivation.
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A.NOREMO Human users can not access the TOE remotely from the internal or
external networks.
4.3.1.3 Connectivity Assumptions
A.IDS IDS is assumed to be configured and maintained as it can access to
and collect all network packets it needs to perform its functions.
A.IDSNET IDS is maintained as no information can flow in the internal
networks without reaching to the IDS also.
4.3.1.4 Underlying System Assumptions
A.GENPUR There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the
ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage
repository capabilities on the TOE.
A.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
A.TOECONF The TOE is installed, configured, and managed in accordance with
its evaluated configuration.
A.AUDIT The underlying operating system will audit the actions of its users.
A.ALLINS All TOE modules are installed on the same computer.
A.DATABS The database as an essential part of IDS is supplied by a third
party and it should be evaluated separately from the IDS.
4.3.2 Threats
Threats to the assets in a PcLab LAN environment composed of Linux, Win98
and Win2000 operating systems will be introduced in this chapter. These threats could
be both to the IDS or its security environment.
In order to identify the threats, the following questions are needed to answer
(ISO/IEC JTC, 1999):
a) What are the assets that require protection?
b) Who or what are the threat agents?
c) What attack methods or undesirable events do the assets need to be protected from?
These questions can be answered either in both top-down or bottom-to-up
approach. In the first approach, the assets of the IT system are defined first and then
possible threats and attackers to those assets are introduced.
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In latter approach, the attack methods are defined first and then the assets
affected by those attacks are introduced. While defining the threats against to IDS and
its security environment, the second bottom-to-top approach is followed in this thesis.
For this reason, Kendalls (Kendall, 1999) attack description model is used,
which is presented in Figure 4.2. This model represents five main methods to be
followed by the attacker and some possible actions done at the end or during these
methods. In Kendalls model, an attacker has an initial privilege level; the attacker may
get the higher privileges than the initial state or stay at the same state at the end of the
attack and does some action such as denying a service. Kendalls model may be used as
illustrated in the following examples:
R-a-Deny(temporary): A user with remote network access temporarily denies a
service.
U-b-S-Alter(Files): An attacker with a local account uses a bug in a program to gain
root access and alter files.
Single letters are used to represent the privileges and methods in Figure 4.2.
Words in the paranthesis after action part show the target or the type of the action.
In the following part possible threats will be introduced. These threats are
produced and grouped by using an attack method oriented view, based on the model
1. Initial Privilege Level
Remote Network
Local Network
User Access
Superuser Access
Physical Access
2. Method of Transition
masquerading
abuse feature
implementation
bug
misconfiguration
social engineering
(inaction)
(Any)
...
3. Final Privilege Level or
Action
Remote Network
Local Network
User Access
Superuser Access
Physical Access
Probe()
Deny()
Intercept()
Alter()
Use()
...
3a. New Level
3b. Action
Figure 4.2: A Summary of Possible Attack Description (Kendall, 1999).
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above. However this approach is aiming to define the attacks; thats why it is
insufficient to define all the threats. In order to make it sufficient, some more methods
can be added in the model such as misuse resulting from inaction or inaction in short
form. These addings, which are not included Kendalls original model, are written in
parenthesis in the Figure 4.2.
For simplification of referencing the threats, they are uniquely labelled by T.,
indicating that it is a threat, followed by the abbreviation of individual threat (eg.,
T.NOAUTH).
4.3.2.1 Threats Countered by the Target of Evaluation
In this sub-section the threats countered by the IDS are defined. These threats
are mainly divided into two groups according to their target: threats targeting the IDS
and threats targeting the IT system which IDS is monitoring. In Figure 4.3 threats
targeting the IDS are illustrated and grouped according to their subjects initial privilege
level, method of transition and final state. The details of those illustrated and grouped
threats are stated in Table 4.2. First three column of Table 4.2 and 4.3 specify the threat
according to Kendalls (Kendall, 1999) attack description model, fourth column
includes the abbreviation of threat and at last column the details of each threat are
specified.
User
masquerad.
abuse
Any
Super user
Super user
Deny
Alter or Use
T.NOAUTH
T.REPLAY,
T.SELPRO, T.DISALT.
T.REPEAT
T.NOHALT
Figure 4.3: TOE Threats.
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Table 4.2: TOE Threats.
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Threat Name Threat Description
U m S T.NOAUTH An unauthorised user may attempt to bypass the security of
the TOE so as to access and use security functions and/or
non-security functions provided by the TOE.
U a S T.REPEAT An unauthorised person may repeatedly try to guess
authentication on the TOE.
T.REPLAY An unauthorised person may use valid identification and
authentication data obtained to access and use functions
provided by the TOE.
T.SELPRO An unauthorised person may read, modify, or destroy
security critical TOE configuration data.
U m Alter or
Use
T.DISALT An unauthorised user may attempt to disclose and alter the
data collected and produced by the TOE.
U Any Deny T.NOHALT An unauthorised user may attempt to deny  the TOEs
functions such as collection and analysis functions by halting
execution of the TOE.
In Figure 4.4 threats targeting the IT System are illustrated and grouped
according to their subjects initial privilege level, method of transition and final state.
Remote
or Local
Network
bug
abuse
misconfig.
Any
Deny
User or Super
user
Probe or
Intercept
T.AUSEVIR
T.AUSEINT
T.AUSEDENY
T.BUGPRIV
T.MISINTIntercept
Figure 4.4: IT System Threats.
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Then threats targeting the IT System are represented in Table 4.3 with their definitions.
Table 4.3: IT System Threats.
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Threat Name Threat Description
R or
L
A Any T.AUSEVIR An attacker from local or remote network may abuse the
network to send any malicious code such as virus or trojan
horses to the IT system.
R or
L
a or
b
Deny T.AUSEDENY An attacker from local or remote network may abuse a
system feature or use a bug of a system service to deny the
service in the IT system such as FTP, TELNET, and NFS.
R or
L
b or
c
U or S T.BUGPRIV An attacker from the remote or local network may use a
service bug, or misconfiguration in the TOE Environment to
get access to the hosts and to have higher privileges than
he/she already has on the accessed host in the IT system.
R or
L
C Intercept T.MISINT An attacker from the remote or local network may use a
misconfigured service in the TOE Environment to intercept
the unauthorised information from IT system such as key
strokes.
R or
L
A Probe or
Intercept
T.AUSEINT An attacker from the remote or local network may abuse the
system to probe or intercept the information such as hosts on
the local network, services on the hosts, known
vulnerabilities and the packets travelling on the local network
in the IT system.
R or
L
- Any T.AUDACC Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they
conduct because the audit records are not reviewed, thus
allowing an attacker to escape detection.
4.3.2.2 Threats Countered by the Operating Environment
Threats countered not by the IDS but the its operational environment are stated
in this sub-section. In table 4.4, these threats have the same presentation style with the
threats in previous section (section 4.3.2.1).
Table 4.4: Threat to be Countered by Operating Environment
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Threat Name Threat Description
U or
S
- Use or
Admin.
T.TUSAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used and
administered in an insecure manner by either authorised or
unauthorised persons (DOD, 2000).
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4.4 Security Objectives
There are two types of security objectives which need to distinguished in a PP:
• Security objectives for the TOE, which will be satisfied by technical (IT)
countermeasures implemented by the TOE;
• Security objectives for the environment, which are to be satisfied by either technical
measures implemented by the IT environment, or by non-IT (e.g. procedural)
measures.
These two types of objectives for IDS and PcLab LAN environment are
presented in this sub-section. While writing those objectives, each threat, defined in
section 4.3, is tried to be countered in full or in part by at least one security objective.
For simplification of referencing the objectives, they are uniquely labelled by
O., indicating that it is an objective, followed by the selected abbreviation of
individual objective (e.g. O.IDAUTH).
4.4.1 Information Technology Security Objectives
The following are the IT security objectives for the TOE:
O.IDAUTH The TOE must uniquely identify and authenticate the claimed
identity of all users, before granting access to TOE functions or, for
certain specified services (DOD, 2000).
O.SINUSE The TOE must prevent the reuse of authentication data for users
attempting to authenticate at the TOE (DOD, 2000).
O.SELPRO The TOE must protect itself against attempts by unauthorised users
to bypass, deactivate, access or tamper with TOE security functions
and data (Stoneburner, 2000; DOD, 2000).
O.AUDREC The TOE must provide a means to record a readable audit trail of
security-related events, with accurate dates and times, and a means to
search and sort the audit trail based on relevant attributes.
O.ACCOUN The TOE must provide user accountability for authorised
administrator use of security functions related to audit.
O.SECFUN The TOE must provide functionality that enables an authorised
administrator to use the TOE security functions, and must ensure that
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only authorised administrators are able to access such functionality
(Common Criteria Org. 2000).
O.EXPORT When any IDS component makes its data available to another IDS
components, the TOE will ensure the confidentiality of that data
(SAIC, 2000).
O.OFLOWS The TOE must appropriately handle potential audit and its data
storage overflows (SAIC, 2000).
O.IDSCOL The collector must collect the network packets, store and supply to
analyzer the processed network packets that might be indicative of
the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of an intrusion
of an IT System.
O.IDSANL The analyzer must get data from IDS collector(s) and the database;
then apply analytical processes and information to derive
conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future) of an IT
system.
O.IDSRESP The Analyzer should respond appropriately and audit when intrusion
is discovered. Depending on the policy, Management Server reacts
to the intrusion when the Analyzer sends an intrusion alarm.
4.4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
All of the assumptions stated in Section 4.3.1, except A.ATTACK, are
considered to be security objectives for the environment. The following are the
Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions,
are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they
will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE. Thus, they will be satisfied
largely through application of procedural or administrative measures (Department of
Defense [DOD], 2000).
O.PROTECT The TOE is physically protected from unauthorised modification by
potentially hostile outsiders.
O.ADMIN One or more non-hostile authorised administrators are assigned who
are competent to manage the TOE and the security of the
information it contains, and who can be trusted not to deliberately
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abuse their privileges so as to undermine security and follow all
administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error.
O.NOREMO Human users can not access the TOE remotely from the internal or
external networks.
O.IDSNET IDS is maintained as no information can flow in the internal
networks without reaching to the IDS also.
O.GENPUR There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability
to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository
capabilities on the TOE.
O.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
O.TOECONF The TOE is installed, configured, and managed in accordance with
its evaluated configuration.
O.AUDIT The underlying system will audit the actions of system users.
O.ALLINS All TOE modules are installed on the same computer.
O.DATABS The database as an essential part of IDS is supplied by the third party
and it should be evaluated separately from the IDS.
O.GUIDAN Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is
delivered, installed, administered, and operated in a manner that
maintains security.
O.ADMTRA Authorised administrators are trained as to establishment and
maintenance of security policies and practices.
For a detailed mapping between threats, assumptions, and the security objectives
listed above see section 4.6 Rationale.
4.5 Information Technology Security Requirements
IT security requirements include:
• TOE security requirements (TSF), and (optionally)
• Security requirements for the TOE's IT environment (that is, for hardware, software,
or firmware external to the TOE and upon which satisfaction of the TOE's security
objectives depends).
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These requirements are discussed separately in following sub-sections.
4.5.1 Target of Evaluation Security Requirements
The CC divides TOE security requirements into two categories (Computer Sciences
Corporation, 1999):
• Security functional requirements (SFRs), that is, requirements for security functions
such as information flow control, audit, identification and authentication.
• Security assurance requirements (SARs), provide grounds for confidence that the
TOE meets its security objectives (for example, configuration management, testing,
vulnerability assessment).
These two categories of TOE security requirements for a PP can be constructed by
using the following inputs (Common Criteria 1999c):
a) Existing functional or assurance requirements components: The TOE functional or
assurance requirements in a PP or ST may be expressed directly, using the
components in Part 2 or 3.
b) Existing packages: Part of the TOE security requirements in a PP or ST may have
already been expressed in a package that may be used. A set of predefined packages
is the EALs defined in Part 3. The TOE assurance requirements in a PP or ST
should include an EAL from Part 3.
c) Extended requirements: Additional functional requirements not contained in Part 2
and/or additional assurance requirements not contained in Part 3 may be used in a
PP or ST.
The first stage in the SFR selection process from existing CC requirements is,
for each security objective for the TOE, to identify the SFRs, which satisfy them. For
the conformance of this satisfaction (ISO/IEC JTC, 1999) and (DOD, 2000) is used as
the guidance and reference. Once a complete set of SFRs has been established, there
then follows an iterative process whereby the complete dependencies between the SFRs
should be satisfied. For instance,
a) The PP may include a security objective requiring the TOE to provide specific
responses to the detection of events indicative of an imminent security violation.
This leads to the inclusion of a principal SFR based on the FAU_ARP.1
(Security Alarms) component.
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b) According to CC, FAU_ARP.1 has a dependency on FAU_SAA.1 (Potential
Violation Analysis) which should also be included as a supporting SFR.
c) FAU_SAA.1 has a dependency on FAU_GEN.1 (Audit Data Generation).
d) FAU_GEN.1 has a dependency on FPT_STM.1 (Reliable Time Stamps).
e) FPT_STM.1 introduces no requirements for additional functional
components.
CC permits a degree of flexibility in the way the SFRs and SARs are specified
by allowing a set of operations to be performed on them to tailor the requirement
appropriately. These are (ISO/IEC JTC, 1999):
a) assignment, where CC allows the inclusion of details specific to a given SFR,
e.g. a series of access control rules to be applied, or a list of subjects or objects
to which the SFR applies;
b) iteration, where CC allows a specific functional or assurance component to be
used more than once in a PP;
c) selection, where CC allows one or more specific options to be selected from a
given list, e.g. to define whether the SFR applies to the displaying and/or
modification of particular data items;
d) refinement, where ISO 15408 allows the PP or ST author to add details to a
functional or assurance component, for example to restrict the possible solutions
to a given SFR or SAR, or to explain in what conditions the refinement is used.
A final point to note is that each security requirement component in CC Part 2
and Part 3 is assigned its own unique reference in CC, based on a defined taxonomy.
For example, the component FAU_GEN.1.2 has the following meaning (ISO/IEC JTC,
1999):
a) F indicates it is a functional requirement;
b) AU indicates it belongs to the security audit class of SFRs;
c) GEN indicates it belongs to the security audit data generation family within
that class;
d) 1 indicates it belongs to the audit data generation component within that
family;
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e) 2 indicates it is the second element within that component.
However, in following section labels of requirements are written in open format
for the first time of their statement in order to increase readability.
4.5.1.1 Target of Evaluation Security Functional Requirements
This section presents the SFRs for the TOE.
Functional security AUdit audit data GENeneration.1: Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
and
c) [the events listed in Table 4.5].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity,
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
definitions of the functional components included in the
PP/ST, [information specified in column three of Table 4.5].
Table 4.5: Auditable Events (cont. on next page).
Functional
Component Auditable Event Contents Additional Audit Record
FAU_ARP.1,
FID_ARP.1
Actions taken due to imminent security violations.
FID_DCL1 Network packet data from TOE network
interface(s)
ID, protocol, source address,
destination address, source
port, destination port, data
portion of the packet
FAU_SAA.1,
2.3.4
FID_IDA.1,2,3
Intrusion data ID, intrusion type, priority,
event ID, module ID
FAU_SAR.1 Reading of information from the audit records
FAU_SEL.1 All modifications to the audit configuration that
occur while the audit collection functions are
operating
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Table 4.5: Auditable Events (cont.).
Functional
Component
Auditable Event Contents Additional Audit Record
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the group of users that are part of
the authorized administrator role
The identity of the
authorized administrator
performing the modification
and the user identity being
associated with the
authorized administrator role
FIA_UID.2 All use of the user identification mechanism. The user identities provided
to the TOE
FIA_UAU.1 All use of the authentication mechanism. The user identities provided
to the TOE
FIA_AFL.1 The reaching of the threshold for unsuccessful
authentication attempts and the subsequent
restoration by the authorized administrator of the
users capability to authenticate.
The identity of the offending
user and the authorized
administrator
FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time The identity of the
authorized administrator
performing the operation
FMT_MOF.1 Use of the functions listed in this requirement
pertaining to audit.
The identity of the
authorized administrator
performing the operation
FAU Security Audit Review.1: Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [an authorized administrator] with the
capability to read [all audit trail data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
user to interpret the information.
FAU SAR.3: Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform searches, sorting,
ordering of audit data based on [all the available attributes of audit
data with logical relations].
FAU security audit event SELection.1: Selective audit
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from
the set of audited events based on the following attributes:
a) event type
b) [and the additional attributes that the event has].
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FAU security audit event SToraGe.1: Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent modifications to the audit records.
FAU STG.4: Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall prevent auditable events except those taken by the
authorized administrator, [shall limit the number of audit records
lost and send an alarm to management server] if the audit trail is
full.
FAU security audit Automatic ResPonse.1: Security alarms
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [one or more of following disruptive actions as
the response] upon detection of a potential security violation.
Assignment: Alerts graded according to their seriousness
having capability to be activated via different notification
channels to different alert destinations, such as e-mail to
administrator, alert lines on user-interface and reports;
closure of session; resetting the connection; deny, degrade,
disturb and deceiving the intruder; and reconfiguring
computer systems.
FAU Security Audit Analysis.1: Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the
audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential
violation of the TSP.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited
events:
a) Accumulation or combination of [audited network packet
data] known to indicate a potential security violation;
b) [assignment: any other rules].
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FAU SAA.2: Profile based anomaly detection
FAU_SAA.2.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain profiles of system usage, where
an individual profile represents the historical patterns of usage
performed by the member(s) of [network groups such as insider
users or outsiders].
FAU_SAA.2.2 The TSF shall be able to maintain a suspicion rating associated with
each user whose activity is recorded in a profile, where the
suspicion rating represents the degree to which the users current
activity is found inconsistent with the established patterns of usage
represented in the profile.
FAU_SAA.2.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent violation of the TSP
when a users suspicion rating exceeds the following threshold
conditions [which are settable automatically by the TOE or
manually by the administrator].
FAU SAA.3: Simple attack heuristics
FAU_SAA.3.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the
following signature events [generated signatures from network
packet data] that may indicate a violation of the TSP.
FAU_SAA.3.2 The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events against the
record of system activity discernible from an examination of
[network packets data].
FAU_SAA.3.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent violation of the TSP
when a system event is found to match a signature event that
indicates a potential violation of the TSP.
FAU SAA.4: Complex attack heuristics
FAU_SAA.4.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the
following event sequences of known intrusion scenarios
[assignment: list of sequences of system events whose occurrence
are representative of known penetration scenarios (Those scenarios
are very dynamic and product specific that's why they are not listed
here.)] and the following signature events [based on the network
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packet data (Those signatures are very dynamic and product specific
that's why they are not listed here.)] that may indicate a potential
violation of the TSP.
FAU_SAA.4.2 The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events and event
sequences against the record of system activity discernible from an
examination of [audited network packet data].
FAU_SAA.4.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent violation of the TSP
when system activity is found to match a signature event or event
sequence that indicates a potential violation of the TSP.
Functional Identification & Authentication Authentication FaiLure.1:
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [a non-zero number settable by {an
authorized administrator}] of unsuccessful authentication attempts
occur related to [users not associated with the authorized
administrator role attempting to authenticate from an internal or
external network].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [prevent the offending user
from successfully authenticating until the administrator takes some
action to make authentication possible for the user in question].
FIA user ATtribute Definition.1: User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users:
a) [Identity
b) association of a human user with the authorized
administrator role;
c) {no other user security attributes}].
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FIA User AUthentication.1: Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [no action] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UAU.4: Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)].
FIA User IDentification.2: User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Functional security ManagmenT Managment Of Functions in TSF.1: Management
of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [perform] the functions:
a) [start up and shut down of the TOE,
b) adding, modifying, deletion of rules, system events and
system event sequences (FID_IDA),
c) enable, disable, determine and modify the behaviour of
all other TOE functions to [the authorized administrator].
FMT Managment Of TSF Data.1: Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to change default, query, modify,
delete, change, assign and add [all TOE data and attributes] to [the
authorized administrator].
FMT_MTD.2: Management of limits on TSF data
FMT_MTD.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the specification of the limits for [the
number of authentication failures] to [the authorized
administrator].
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FMT_MTD.2.2 The TSF shall take the following actions, if the TSF data are at, or
exceed, the indicated limits: [actions specified in FIA_AFL.1.2].
FMT Security Management Role.1: Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the role [authorized administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate human users with the authorized
administrator role.
Functional Protection of the TSF Internal TOE TSF data Transfer.1: Basic
internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from both disclosure and
modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of the
TOE.
FPT Refernece V Mediation.1: Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked
and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to
proceed.
FPT domain SEParation.1: TSF domain separation
FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of
subjects in the TSC.
FPT time STaMps.1: Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own
use.
Proposed Intrusion Detection Class Requirements
CC recognises that there may be cases where there is no appropriate functional
or assurance component in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3. In this case, the IT security
requirements may be stated explicitly without reference to CC; however, such
requirements must be unambiguous, evaluatable, and expressed in a similar style to
existing CC components. On this ground of allowance, a Proposed Intrusion Detection
Class is written and presented at Appendix D. The reason of writing a new requirement
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class is that there is no any class in CC Part 2 for defining real-time intrusion detection
requirements. This new class, which has similar style of Functional Security Audit
Class (FAU), includes some components related to collection of data, analyze of
collected data and response of detected intrusions.
Functional Intrusion Detection Automatic ResPonse.1: Security alarms
FID_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [one or more of following disruptive actions as
the response] upon detection of an intrusion.
Assignment: Alerts graded according to their seriousness
having capability to be activated via different notification
channels to different alert destinations, such as e-mail to
administrator, alert lines on user-interface and reports;
closure of session; resetting the connection; deny, degrade,
disturb and deceiving the intruder; and reconfiguring
computer systems.
FID Data CoLlection.1: Data Collection
FID_DCL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to collect, [store in the database and/or sent
for the analysis] [network packet data from TOE network
interface(s)] from the IT system resources.
FID Intrusion Detection Analysis.1: Intrusion detection analysis
FID_IDA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the
collected event data and based upon these rules indicate an
intrusion.
FID_IDA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring collected
data:
a) Accumulation or combination of [assignment: subset of
defined collectable event data] known to indicate an
intrusion;
b) [assignment: any other rules].
FID_IDA.2: Simple attack heuristics
FID_IDA.2.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the
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following signature events [signatures generated from network
packets data] that may indicate an intrusion.
FID_IDA.2.2 The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events against the
collected system data discernible from an examination of [network
packets data].
FID_IDA.2.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent intrusion when a
system event is found to match a signature event that indicates an
intrusion.
FID_IDA.3: Complex attack heuristics
FID_IDA.3.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the
following event sequences of known intrusion scenarios
[assignment: list of sequences of system events whose occurrence
are representative of known penetration scenarios (Those scenarios
are very dynamic and product specific that's why they are not listed
here.)] and the following signature events [based on the network
packet data (Those signatures are very dynamic and product specific
that's why they are not listed here.)] that may indicate an intrusion.
FID_IDA.3.2 The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events and event
sequences against the collected system data discernible from an
examination of [network packet data].
FID_IDA.3.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent intrusion when
system activity is found to match a signature event or event
sequence that indicates an intrusion.
4.5.1.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Table 4.6 identifies the security assurance components drawn from CC Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements; these requirements are restated in Appendix C.
Table 4.6: Restated TOE Security Assurance Requirements (cont. on next page).
Class Assurance Component
ID
Assurance Component Name
ACM: Configuration
management
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery proceduresADO Delivery and
operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
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Table 4.6: Restated TOE Security Assurance Requirements (cont.).
Class Assurance Component
ID
Assurance Component Name
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high- level design
ADV: Development
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidanceAGD: Guidance
documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluationAVA: Vulnerability
assessment AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis
4.5.2 Security Requirements for the Information Technology Environment
The TOE has no security requirements allocated to its IT environment.
4.6 Rationale
This section demonstrates the completeness and consistency of this PP. The
security objectives for the IT and environment are explained in terms of threats
countered and assumptions met. The security functional requirements (SFR) are
explained in terms of objectives met by the requirement. The traceability and
consistency is illustrated through matrices that map the following:
! security objectives to threats countered
! objectives to assumptions met
! SFRs to objectives met
4.6.1 Rationale For Information Technology Security Objectives
In Table 4.7, mapping between objectives and threats are presented. By this
way, it would be possible to see which threat is countered by which objective. One
threat must be countered by at least one objective, on the other hand many objectives
can counter the same threat. These objectives should be satisfied by IDS requirements.
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Table 4.7: Summary of Mappings Between Threats, Policies and IT Security Objectives.
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O.IDSCOL X X X X X
O.IDSANL X X X X X
O.IDSRESP X X X X X X
O.IDAUTH X X X
O.SINUSE X X
O.SELPRO X X X X X
O.AUDREC X
O.ACCOUN X
O.SECFUN X X X
O.EXPORT X X
O.OFLOWS X X
4.6.2 Rationale For Security Objectives for the Environment
Table 4.8 represents mapping and tracibility between security objectives which
are satisfied by the working environment and threats.
Table 4.8: Summary of Mapping Between Threats and Security Objectives for the Environment.
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Since the rest of the security objectives for the environment are, in part 4.4.2,
statement of the security assumptions, those security objectives trace to all aspects of
the assumptions. Thus they are not quoted in table 4.8.
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4.6.3 Rationale For Security Requirements
As being the last section of Rationale, mapping between security functional
requirements and objectives is presented in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Summary of Mappings Between Functional Requirements and Objectives for the TOE (cont.
on next page).
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FAU_ARP.1 X
FAU_GEN.1 X X X X
FAU_.SAA.1 X
FAU_.SAA.2 X
FAU_.SAA.3 X
FAU_.SAA.4 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
FAU_SAR.3 X
FAU_STG.1 X X X
FAU_STG.4 X X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_ATD.1 X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_UAU.4 X
FIA_UID.2 X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MTD.1 X
FMT_MTD.2 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_ITT.1 X
FPT_RVM.1 X
FPT_SEP.1 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FID_ARP.1 X
61
Table 4.9: Summary of Mappings Between Functional Requirements and Objectives for the TOE (cont.).
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FID_IDA.1,2,3 X
 Chapter 5 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM PROTECTION PROFILE
IMPLEMENTATION ON PRODUCT EVALUATION
Internet Security Systems (ISS) RealSecureTM (Version 6.0) is evaluated against
the Intrusion Detection System Protection Profile for PC Laboratory LAN Environment
(Chapter 4) in sub-section 5.2. A brief overview about RealSecure IDS is presented
before this evaluation in sub-section 5.1.
5.1 RealSecure Version 6.0
Realsecure is an automated real-time intrusion detection system that uses built-
in attack signatures and statistical profiles to detect different types of misuse for
computer networks and hosts. It consists of following basic sub-systems:
• RealSecure Network Sensor runs on a dedicated system that monitors network
traffic for attack signatures  definitive identifiers that an intrusion is underway.
Attack recognition, incident response, and intrusion prevention occur immediately,
with customization of signatures and response capabilities.
• OS Sensor is installed on hosts in the network and monitors the host audit logs and
other host-specific data sources.
• RealSecure Server Sensor performs real-time intrusion monitoring, detection, and
prevention of malicious activity by analyzing kernel-level events, host logs, and
network activity on critical servers. Server sensor monitors, detects, and prevents
intrusions with packet interception, blocking capability, and automated correlation
analysis using security fusion technology.
• RealSecure Workgroup Manager provides centralized, scalable management,
configuration, reporting, and real-time alarming for all RealSecure Sensors. The
Workgroup Manager is based on a three-tiered architecture, and supports an
enterprise database, MSDE or Microsoft SQL (Internet Security Systems, 2001a;
Internet Security Systems, 2001b). The management console displays real-time
alarm data in a standard Windows activity tree mode, where the data in the tree can
be sorted by destination address, source address, or event name. Events contain an
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icon that indicates the severity as well as a distinct event name. Multiple
occurrences of the same event are combined into a single notification. Event data
(detected potential intrusion event. Event is used with same meaning of intrusion
event in RealSecure literature.) can also be stored in an ODBC-compliant database
for generation of reports. Reports are available in text and graphic formats and the
user can launch customized reports from the interface. Reporting features allow the
administrator to sort and format event data by priority, source address, destination
address, or network service over some period of time (Jackson, 1999).
RealSecure sensors use policies that control what the sensor monitors and how it
responds to events that it detects. The features of the network sensor are controlled
through these policies which can be either the pre-defined policies that ship with the
sensors, or customized policies. Following operations are allowed for customizing the
policies:
• customize (fine-tune) pre-defined signatures where a signature is the internal code
that RealSecure uses to detect an event, or series of events, that might signal an
attack on network or that can provide security-related information.
• determine how the sensor responds to events where responds include recording the
date, time, source, and target of the event; recording the content of the event;
notifying the network administrator; reconfiguring the firewall; terminating the
event automatically.
• monitor attempted and successful network connections.
• have the sensor ignore specific traffic to and from trusted computers
• create custom signatures to monitor specific activity that other signatures do not
detect.
5.2 Evaluation of RealSecure Version 6.0
According to CC, evaluations are carried out by accredited evaluation facilities
(testing laboratories). The evaluation process is illustrated in Figure 5.1. This procedure
includes three basic steps (Common Criteria Org. 1999a):
1. PP evaluation: The PP evaluation is carried out against the evaluation criteria for
PPs contained in Part 3 (Common Criteria Org. 1999c). The goal of such an
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evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, and technically
sound and suitable for use as a statement of requirements for an evaluatable TOE.
2. ST evaluation: The evaluation of the ST for the TOE is carried out against the
evaluation criteria for STs contained in Part 3 (Common Criteria Org. 1999c). The
goal of such an evaluation is twofold: first to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, and technically sound and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation; second, in the case where an ST claims
conformance to a PP, to demonstrate that the ST properly meets the requirements of
the PP.
3. TOE evaluation: The TOE evaluation is carried out against the evaluation criteria
contained in Part 3 (Common Criteria Org. 1999c) using an evaluated ST as the
basis. The goal of such an evaluation is to demonstrate that the TOE meets the
security requirements contained in the ST.
The IDS PP for PcLab LAN Environment is used here directly for evaluation of
RealSecure without any evaluation of testing laboratories and ST. For the evaluation of
RealSecure, Table 5.1 (functional requirements) and Table 5.2 (assurance requirements)
are created based on IDS PP for PcLab LAN Environment, presented in Chapter 4. The
first three columns of these tables identify the assessed requirement with its ID, name
and element number. The individual requirement assessments at each row may get the
following four result values:
• Not satisfied (N); Requirement is not included in product.
Figure 5.1: Evaluation Process and Results (Common Criteria Org. 1999a).
Evaluate
PP
Catalogue
PP
PP
Evaluation
Results
Evaluated
PP
Evaluate
ST
ST
Evaluation
Results
Evaluate
TOE
TOE
Evaluation
Results
Catalogue
Certificates
Evaluated
TOE
65
• Partially satisfied (P); Product includes specification(s) which meet(s) the
requirement but does/do not exactly fit the definition of requirement.
• Satisfied (S); Product includes specification(s) which exactly fit(s) the requirement
definition.
• Unknown (U): This requirement could not be tested with available information
sources.
These results are represented at Result column of the tables and the additional
descriptions are done at description column if needed. (The details of evaluated
requirements can be found at Chapter 4 and Appendix C.) Following three main sources
are used as the bases of this evaluation:
• Documentation of RealSecure (Internet Security Systems, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c,
2001d, 2001e).
• RealSecure v6.0 installed on İzmir Institute of Technology, Department of
Computer Engineering, PC Laboratory. This installation, used in the evaluation,
includes network sensor and management console only.
• Previous reviews and assesments on RealSecure such as Jackson, 1999 and ICSA
Labs, 1999.
Table 5.1: ISS RealSecure Functional Requirements Assessment Table (cont. on next page).
Functional
Component ID
Functional
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
FAU Security Audit Automatic Response _______
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms 1 N Security alarms are not resulted from audit
data analysis.
FAU Security Audit Generation _______
1 P Only detected potential intrusion event data is
audited.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
2 P Audit data details are satisfied only for
intrusion event data.
FAU Security Audit Analysis N This evaluated installation does not perform
any audit data analysis because it includes
only network sensor.
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Table 5.1: ISS RealSecure Functional Requirements Assessment Table (cont.).
Functional
Component ID
Functional
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
1 N _______FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation
analysis 2 N _______
1 N _______
2 N _______
FAU_SAA.2 Profile based anomaly
detection
3 N _______
1 N _______
2 N _______
FAU_SAA.3 Simple attack
heuristics
3 N _______
1 N _______
2 N _______
FAU_SAA.4 Complex attack
heuristics
3 N _______
FAU Security Audit Review _______
1 P Not only the administrator but also all the o/s
users can view audit records, which are
stored in database.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
1 S _______
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit
review
1 P Only sorting and ordering operations
available on audit records.
FAU Security Audit Event Selection _______
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit 1 S _______
FAU Security Audit Event Storage _______
1 N _______FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail
storage 2 N _______
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit
data loss
1 N _______
FIA Authentication Failure N There is no any authentication mechanism for
the users.
1 N _______FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure
handling 2 N _______
FIA User Attribute Definition N There is no any user attribute definition.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute
definition
1 N _______
FIA User Authentication N There is no any authentication mechanism for
the users.
1 N _______FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication 2 N _______
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use
authentication
mechanisms
1 N _______
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Table 5.1: ISS RealSecure Functional Requirements Assessment Table (cont.).
Functional
Component ID
Functional
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
FIA User Identification N There is no any identification mechanism.
FIA_UID.2 User identification
before any action
1 N _______
FMT Managment of Functions _______
FMT_MOF.1 Management of
security functions
behavior
1 P Work Group Manager (Management Module)
based restrictions are available.
FMT Management of Data N _______
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF
data
1 N _______
1 N _______FMT_MTD.2 Management of limits
on TSF data 2 N _______
FMT Security Management Role N _______
1 N _______FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
2 N _______
FPT Internal Data Transfer _______
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF
data transfer
protection
1 P Only encryption is available.
FPT Reference Mediation _______
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of
the TSP
U _______
FPT Domain Separation _______
1 U _______FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain
separation 2 U _______
FPT Time Stamps _______
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps 1 U _______
FID Automatic Response _______
FID_ARP.1 Security alarms 1 S Real-time alarms via console and different
ways.
FID Data Collection
FID_DCL.1 Data Collection 1 P Only collects but does not store collected
data.
FID Intrusion Detection Analysis _______
1 S _______FID_IDA.1 Intrusion detection
analysis 2 S _______
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Table 5.1: ISS RealSecure Functional Requirements Assessment Table (cont.).
Functional
Component ID
Functional
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
1 S _______
2 S _______
FID_IDA.2 Simple attack
heuristics
3 S _______
1 U _______
2 U _______
FID_IDA.3 Complex attack
heuristics
3 U _______
The Table 5.2 has the similar structure with Table 5.1. Additionally, in the third
column of Table 5.2, C and D are used to indicate the Developer action elements,
Content and presentation of elements respectively. The evaluator action elements of
assurance requirements are not included in Table 5.2 and not evaluated, since
RealSecure has not been evaluated by any evaluation labratory (see Appendix C for
details of those three sets of element).
Table 5.2: ISS RealSecure Security Assurance Requirements Assessment Table (cont. on next page).
Assurance
Component ID
Assurance
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items _______
1 C, D S _______
2 C, D S _______
3 C, D S Included in user-guides, not a separated
configuration document
4 C S _______
5 C S _______
6 C S _______
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures _______
1 C, D U Not able to reach or find out any delivery
procedure.
2 D U _______
ADO_IGS.1 Installation,
generation, and start-
up procedures
1 C, D S Developer supplies installation guides for
each module.
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Table 5.2: ISS RealSecure Security Assurance Requirements Assessment Table (cont.).
Assurance
Component ID
Assurance
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional
specification
_______
1 C, D S _______
2 C U Internal consistency does not evaluated.
3 C P Error messages and exceptions are not
included in functional specifications.
4 C S _______
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high- level
design
_______
1 C, D S _______
2 C U Internal consistency does not evaluated and
unknown.
3 C S _______
4 C S _______
5 C S _______
6 C S _______
7 C S _______
ADV_RCR.1 Informal
correspondence
demonstration
1 C, D U Such a demonstration can not be found in
public domain.
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator
guidance
There are no different roles in RealSecure
such as user and administrator so user and
administrator guidances are the same.
1 C, D S _______
2 C S _______
3 C S _______
4 C S _______
5 C S _______
6 C S _______
7 C U _______
8 C P Guidence is describing some security
requirements for the IT environment but not
the all.
AGD_USR.1 User guidance P There are no different roles in RealSecure
such as user and administrator so user and
administrator guidances are the same.
Hoverer, RealSecure guidences have similar
content.
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage C, D N _______
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing _______
1 C, D N _______
2 C, D N _______
3 C N _______
4 C N _______
5 C N _______
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Table 5.2: ISS RealSecure Security Assurance Requirements Assessment Table(cont.).
Assurance
Component ID
Assurance
Component Name El
em
en
t N
o
R
es
ul
t
Description
1 C, D U _______ATE_IND.2 Independent testing -
sample 2 C U _______
1 C, D U _______AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE
security function
evaluation 2 C U _______
1 C N _______AVA_VLA.1 Developer
vulnerability analysis 2 D N _______
The following conclusions are drawn from the evaluation of RealSecure
requirement assessment:
• Intrusion Detection: Applied intrusion detection mechanisms are not clearly
identified in detail so that RealSecure is a black-box for its intrusion detection
techniques. It fits basic collect, analyze, detect and respond IDS approach in real-
time and implements it on client-server architecture. Its documentation (Internet
Security Systems, 2001e) says that RealSecure applies signature based intrusion
detection technique somehow, however the details of this applied technique are not
explained.
• Auditing: RealSecure does not audit the important events related to its own
operations such as errors, start up and shutdown of its functionalities and so on. It
audits detected potential intrusions, this intrusions can be viewed on the GUI or in
report format according to their attributes such as priority, intrusion type and so on.
• Authentication and Identification: Although there is no user identification capability
for the users, modules have their own identity and password. Management module
should use this predefined identity and password of the sensor in order to connect to
that sensor. So there is a module based identification and authentication. Since
RealSecure does not have any user identification and authentication functionality
before allowing any operation, so it should be better to install and run it in the
physically separated/isolated and secured environment. Otherwise any valid user of
its underlying o/s can manage it and use all functionality provided by RealSecure.
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• Management: As RealSecure does not have any user identification, security
administrator can not give different roles to different underlying IT system users and
different restrictions can not be applied on different roles. Different sensors can be
associated by different management consoles and all management jobs can be
performed by only those consoles on the sensors. So management restrictions are
applicable module-by-module.
• Data Protection: RealSecure supports the communication encryption between its
modules but it does not perform integrity checking on the received data.
• Configuration: RealSecure has a configuration management system. The
configuration can be performed either via GUI or by editing configuration script
files. However the format of this script does not explained in guidances.
Configuration guidance only explains the configuration performed via GUI.
• Documentation and Guidance: The developer supplies most of the documentation
defined in the assurance requirements including installation, maintenance,
configuration, high level design and functional specification for each module of
RealSecure. Developer only gives Getting Started Guide and Installation Guide
(Internet Security Systems, 2001d, 2001e) with the purchased product as books. The
other documentation supplied by the developer is freely available on the Internet.
• Testing: Although there are some independent test results available on the internet,
there is no any test result available supplied by the developer (Internet Security
Systems) either done by developer or independent evaluator.
Some requirements available in the IDS PP for PcLab LAN Environment are not
evaluated since neither RealSecure does not supply necessary information for those
requirements evaluation nor there is no evaluation or test results supplied by either
developer or an independent test laboratory.
 Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The objective of this thesis is to explore the requirements, standards and
guidelines to review, evaluate and possibly to develop an IDS. This chapter concludes
this research effort. The overview of previous chapters and research effort will be
summarized and conclusions are presented in this summary part first. Then following
the conclusion, discussion and recommendations for future work are presented.
Chapter 2 begins with a background information about intrusion, intrusion
detection systems, client server architecture and security software quality assurance.
After this background information is given, the methodology followed in this research is
presented. This methodology is based on the assumption that, in order to develop a
Common Criteria Protection Profile for a product, a generic model of this product
should be developed first.
In Chapter 3, a generic IDS model is developed first in order to achieve the
thesis objective. There are some researches presenting only IDS models and there are
some others presenting only requirements for the generic IDSs in the literature (Internet
Security Systems, 2000, Metcalf and LaPadula, 2000, Lodin, 1998, Puketza et al. 1994).
In this thesis, these models and requirements are combined to obtain a generic IDS
model, which is a client-server architecture.
This generic IDS model and its requirements provide to see the IDS picture
clearly. However, it does not provide evidence/assurance of competence and
consistency of IDS requirements. Thats why, in Chapter 4, an IDS Protection Profile
(PP) is written to encapsulate security functional and assurance requirements for PC
Laboratory LAN environment. During the development process of this PP, Common
Criteria Protection Profile development methodology is followed. This development
process establishes a level of confidence that the security functions of IDS and the
assurance measures applied to them are meet. Common Criteria (CC) PP development
methodology includes the following steps: At first step, the IDS, its general IT features
and architecture are identified. Studies performed in Chapter 3, generic IDS model and
its requirements, can construct the base of this step for IDSs. Then, the environment in
which IDS would operate is considered in particular identifying the security problems
73
and challenges that must be addressed. That identification activity is, in essence, a risk
analysis and leads to a statement of general needs or security objectives to be met both
by the IDS and its environment.
Part 2 catalogue of CC, includes well-defined and understood security functional
requirements that can be used as a standard way of expressing the security requirements
for IT products and systems. Security objectives are transformed through the use of that
Part 2 catalogue of CC into a set of statements that are coherent and mutually supportive
security functional requirements. In addition to the available security requirements in
Part 2 of CC, proposed functional requirements are written specific to IDSs.
There are some officially evaluated and registered security product PPs such as
Traffic-Filter Firewall Protection Profile For Medium Robustness Environments
Version 1.4. Since selection operation of the functional requirements from the Part 2
catalogue is not clearly defined in CC, Traffic Filter Firewall PP is used as a guide,
model and example for functional requirement selection.
Finally, based on the desired level of confidence in the security of products to be
built, an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) from Part 3 is assigned and assurance
requirements are restated for this EAL.
It is desirable to submit a PP to an independent testing laboratory for evaluation,
to ensure that it is correct, complete, and internally consistent. The evaluated PP may
then be entered into a central registry for use by the community to communicate the
product security needs to manufacturers, either informally or by incorporation into
procurement documents. However, this evaluation necessitates a sponsoring
organization covering the evaluation cost. Thats why the IDS PP in Chapter 4 has not
been evaluated by an independent laboratory.
The developed IDS PP is implemented on evaluation of RealSecure IDS, which
is installed on İzmir Instituted of Technology, Department of Computer Engineering,
PC Laboratory. This evaluated installation of RealSecure is including one network
sensor and management console. Two different tables for security functional and
assurance requirements are constructed, based on the IDS PP for PC Lab LAN
environment. Then evaluation and conclusions are achieved on these tables. Each
defined requirement in IDS PP is evaluated according to its existency in RealSecure.
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Requirement assessments are valued by the following logical phrases, satisfied, not
satisfied, partially satisfied and unknown.
During the above development and implementation process of IDS PP, the
following observation has been made; some of the assurance requirements are at
abstract level and not measurable in CC such as The Target of Evaluation shall be
suitable for testing. Those abstract level requirements make the evaluation
comparatively harder.
IDS consumers who are not familiar with IDSs and PP development can use this
thesis for simple selection and evaluation of IDS products directly via checklists. The
presented requirements can be manipulated into a requirement checklist. Such a simple
checklist is introduced in Appendix A as an example. More detailed one can be
constructed from the requirements in Chapter 3 according to IDS consumers needs.
In this thesis, the CC, requirement presentation format, its development and
evaluation methodologies are used and suggested as the standards and guidelines for
quality assurance of IDS. In the future, any IDS developer or evaluator, can follow the
same methodology with this thesis and use the generic IDS model and IDS PP for
PcLab LAN environment. However, definitions of requirements and specifications
should be made in more detail and measurable way, for a specific IDS product. For this
reason, CC Security Target model can be used for defining product-specific requirement
presentation in the further studies.
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 APPENDIX A 
IDS ASSESSMENT TABLE
In this appendix an IDS assessment table is introduced. Similar tables are given
in (ICSA Labs, 1999) and (Jackson, 1999), but here the difference is that this table is
based on the model which is explained in Chapter three. The requirements of IDS are
summarized, grouped and included according to the IDS components introduced in the
IDS model (Chapter 3).
The existing components of IDS are checked in the first row of table. Since
different IDSs may have these modules with different names according to the vendor or
the product, the available components of IDS will be checked according to their
functionality. The user of the table will fill the empty boxes by checking them if the
individual property exists in the IDS.
Then in each subsection of the table, IDS modules are examined according to
the requirements of modules. As those requirements are mentioned before, they won't
be explained here again.
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Table A.1: IDS Assessment Table.
IDS name:
Existing Modules
GUI Management Server Database Server Collector Analyzer
GUI
Deployment Windows
remote local IDS modules policies configuration detected intrusions reports other
Management Server
Response Functions (Key: [broad, limited, none]) Deployment
active passive intrusion
definition
response audit record
definition
report generation encryption
options
remote local
Database Server
Databases Architecture
policy asset audit intrusion local distributed
Collector Analyzer
Information Source Architecture Method Analysis
network O/S application file
system
other local distributed anomaly
detection
misuse
detection
other batch real-time
 APPENDIX B 
COVERAGE OF SOFTWARE ENGINEERING STANDARDS
The purpose of table B.1 is to provide the coverage of the respective three
approaches to software engineering, IEEE Software Engineering (SWE) Standards,
ISO/IEC 12207 Information technology-Software life cycle processes, ISO 9000 quality
standards and ISO 9000-3, Guidelines for the application of ISO 9001 to the
development, supply, and maintenance of software.
Table B.1: Software Engineering Standards Table (Schultz, 2000).
Subject Area IEEE SWE
Standards
ISO/IEC 12207 ISO 9001, 9000-3
Program Management X X X
S/W Life Cycle
Processes X X
S/W Acquisition X X
Contract
Preparation X X
Contract Review X X
System
Engineering X X
System
Requirements X X
Software
Requirements X X
Software Design X X X
Implementation X X X
System Test X X X
Operations X X
Maintenance X X
Quality
Management X
Quality
Assurance X X X
Configuration
Management X X X
Reuse X
Documentation X X X
Measurement X X
Training X X
 APPENDIX C 
COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY ASSURANCE
REQUIREMENTS
The security assurance components drawn from CC Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements are restated for EAL2. These requirements are directly quoted from
Common Criteria: Part 3 (Common Criteria Org. 1999c) with out any modification.
A set of assurance elements is provided for each assurance component. An
assurance element is a security requirement, which if further divided, would not yield a
meaningful evaluation result. It is the smallest security requirement recognised in the
CC. Each assurance element is identified as belonging to one of the three sets of
assurance elements (Common Criteria. Org. 1999c):
a) Developer action elements: the activities that shall be performed by the developer.
This set of actions is further qualified by evidential material referenced in the
following set of elements. Requirements for developer actions are identified by
appending the letter D to the element number.
b) Content and presentation of evidence elements: the evidence required, what the
evidence shall demonstrate, and what information the evidence shall convey.
Requirements for content and presentation of evidence are identified by appending
the letter C to the element number.
c) Evaluator action elements: the activities that shall be performed by the evaluator.
This set of actions explicitly includes confirmation that the requirements prescribed
in the content and presentation of evidence elements have been met. It also includes
explicit actions and analysis that shall be performed in addition to that already
performed by the developer. Implicit evaluator actions are also to be performed as a
result of developer action elements which are not covered by content and
presentation of evidence requirements. Requirements for evaluator actions are
identified by appending the letter E to the element number.
The developer actions and content and presentation of evidence define the
assurance requirements that are used to represent a developers responsibilities in
demonstrating assurance in the TOE security functions. By meeting these requirements,
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the developer can increase confidence that the TOE satisfies the functional and
assurance requirements of a PP or ST (Common Criteria Org. 1999c).
The evaluator actions define the evaluator's responsibilities in the two aspects of
evaluation. The first aspect is validation of the PP/ST, in accordance with the classes
APE and ASE in clauses 4 and 5. The second aspect is verification of the TOE's
conformance with its functional and assurance requirements. By demonstrating that the
PP/ST is valid and that the requirements are met by the TOE, the evaluator can provide
a basis for confidence that the TOE will meet its security objectives (Common Criteria
Org. 1999c).
Assurance Configuration Management CAPabilities.2: Configuration items
Developer action elements:
ACM_CAP.2.1D The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE.
ACM_CAP.2.2D. The developer shall use a CM system.
ACM_CAP.2.3D The developer shall provide CM documentation.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ACM_CAP.2.1C The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the
TOE.
ACM_CAP.2.2C The TOE shall be labeled with its reference.
ACM_CAP.2.3C The CM documentation shall include a configuration list.
ACM_CAP.2.4C The configuration list shall describe the configuration items that
comprise the TOE.
ACM_CAP.2.5C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to
uniquely identify the configuration items.
ACM_CAP.2.6C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
Evaluator action elements:
ACM_CAP.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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Assurance Delivery and Operation DELivery.1: Delivery procedures
Developer action elements:
ADO_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the user.
ADO_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ADO_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are
necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the
TOE to a users site.
Evaluator action elements:
ADO_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADO Installation, Generation and Start-up.1: Installation, generation, and start-
up procedures
Developer action elements:
ADO_IGS.1.1D The developer shall document procedures necessary for the
secure installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ADO_IGS.1.1C The documentation shall describe the steps necessary for secure
installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ADO_IGS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADO_IGS.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the installation, generation,
and start-up procedures result in a secure configuration.
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Assurance DeVelopment Functional SPecification.1: Informal functional
specification
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its
external interfaces using an informal style.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall be internally consistent.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and
method of use of all external TSF interfaces, providing details of
effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is
an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security
functional requirements.
ADV High-Level Design.1: Descriptive high-level design
Developer action elements:
ADV_HLD.1.1D The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ADV_HLD.1.1C The presentation of the high-level design shall be informal.
ADV_HLD.1.2C The high-level design shall be internally consistent.
ADV_HLD.1.3C The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in
terms of subsystems.
ADV_HLD.1.4C The high-level design shall describe the security functionality
provided by each subsystem of the TSF.
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ADV_HLD.1.5C The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware,
firmware, and/or software required by the TSF with a
presentation of the functions provided by the supporting
protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware, firmware,
or software.
ADV_HLD.1.6C The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_HLD.1.7C The high-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the
subsystems of the TSF are externally visible.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_HLD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_HLD.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the high-level design is an
accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.
ADV Representation of CoRrespondence.1: Informal correspondence
demonstration
Developer action elements:
ADV_RCR.1.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence
between all adjacent pairs of TSF representations that are
provided.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ADV_RCR.1.1C For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the
analysis shall demonstrate that all relevant security functionality
of the more abstract TSF representation is correctly and
completely refined in the less abstract TSF representation.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_RCR.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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Assurance Guidance Documents ADMinistrator guidance.1: Administrator
guidance
Developer action elements:
AGD_ADM.1.1D The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to
system administrative personnel.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AGD_ADM.1.1C The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative
functions and interfaces available to the administrator of the
TOE.
AGD_ADM.1.2C The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer the
TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_ADM.1.3C The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment.
AGD_ADM.1.4C The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions
regarding user behavior that are relevant to secure operation of
the TOE.
AGD_ADM.1.5C The administrator guidance shall describe all security parameters
under the control of the administrator, indicating secure values as
appropriate.
AGD_ADM.1.6C The administrator guidance shall describe each type of security-
relevant event relative to the administrative functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of
entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_ADM.1.7C The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other
documentation supplied for evaluation.
AGD_ADM.1.8C The administrator guidance shall describe all security
requirements for the IT environment that are relevant to the
administrator.
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Evaluator action elements:
AGD_ADM.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD UseR guidance.1: User guidance
Developer action elements:
AGD_USR.1.1D The developer shall provide user guidance.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AGD_USR.1.1C The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces
available to the non-administrative users of the TOE.
AGD_USR.1.2C The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible
security functions provided by the TOE.
AGD_USR.1.3C The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment.
AGD_USR.1.4C The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities
necessary for secure operation of the TOE, including those
related to assumptions regarding user behavior found in the
statement of TOE security environment.
AGD_USR.1.5C The user guidance shall be consistent with all other
documentation supplied for evaluation.
AGD_USR.1.6C The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for the
IT environment that are relevant to the user.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_USR.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
Assurance TEsts COVerage.1: Evidence of coverage
Developer action elements:
ATE_COV.1.1D The developer shall provide evidence of the test coverage.
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Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ATE_COV.1.1C The evidence of the test coverage shall show the correspondence
between the tests identified in the test documentation and the
TSF as described in the functional specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_COV.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE FUNctional tests.1: Functional testing
Developer action elements:
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test procedure
descriptions, expected test results and actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the security functions to be tested
and describe the goal of the tests to be performed.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be
performed and describe the scenarios for testing each security
function. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from
a successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.5C The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall
demonstrate that each tested security function behaved as
specified.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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ATE INDependent testing.2: Independent testing  sample
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to
those that were used in the developers functional testing of the
TSF.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF as appropriate to
confirm that the TOE operates as specified.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test
documentation to verify the developer test results.
Assurance Vulnerability Assessment Strength Of TOE security Function.1:
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
Developer action elements:
AVA_SOF.1.1D The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function
analysis for each mechanism identified in the ST as having a
strength of TOE security function claim.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AVA_SOF.1.1C For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function
claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show
that it meets or exceeds the minimum strength level defined in
the PP/ST.
AVA_SOF.1.2C For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security
function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis
shall show that it meets or exceeds the specific strength of
92
function metric defined in the PP/ST.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_SOF.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_SOF.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the strength claims are correct.
AVA VuLnerability Analysis.1: Developer vulnerability analysis
Developer action elements:
AVA_VLA.1.1D The developer shall perform and document an analysis of the
TOE deliverables searching for obvious ways in which a user can
violate the TSP.
AVA_VLA.1.2D The developer shall document the disposition of obvious
vulnerabilities.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AVA_VLA.1.1C The documentation shall show, for all identified vulnerabilities,
including those identified in Appendix A of ALFPP v1.d.1, that
the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended environment
for the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VLA.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VLA.1.2E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, building on the
developer vulnerability analysis, to ensure obvious
vulnerabilities have been addressed.
 APPENDIX D 
PROPOSED COMMON CRITERIA INTRUSION DETECTION
CLASS
Class FID: Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection class involves collecting, recognising, and analysing information
related to IT system activities (i.e. activities controlled by the TSP). The collected data
from IT system sources can be examined to determine the past, present and future
intrusions occurance.
Intrusion detection automatic response (FID_ARP)
Family behaviour:
This family defines the response to be taken in case of detected events indicative of an
intrusion.
At FID_ARP.1 Security alarms, the TSF shall take actions in case an intrusion is
detected.
Management: FID_ARP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) the management (addition, removal, or modification) of actions.
FID_ARP Intrusion detection automatic response 1
FID_ARP Intrusion detection automatic response 1
FID_DCL Intrusion detection collection 1
FID_IDA Intrusion detection analysis 1 2 3
Intrusion detection
Figure D.1: Intrusion detection class decomposition.
Component levelling:
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Audit: FID_ARP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FID_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Actions taken due to imminent intrusions.
FID_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FID_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: list of the least disruptive
actions] upon detection of an intrusion.
Dependencies: FID_IDA.1 Intrusion analysis
Intrusion detection collection (FID_DCL)
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for collecting the occurrence of security relevant
events and/or data that take place under TSF control and IT system. This family
identifies the level of collecting, enumerates the types of events that shall be collectable
by the TSF.
FID_DCL.1 Data collection defines the level of collectable events, and specifies the list
of data that shall be collected.
Management: FID_IDC.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the collectable events.
Audit: FID_IDC.1
The following actions should be auditable if FID_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Enabling and disabling of any of the collection mechanisms.
FID_DCL Intrusion detection collection 1
Component levelling:
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FID_DCL.1 Data Collection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FID_DCL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to collect [assignment: other specifically
defined possible actions such as store in the database and/or send for the
analysis] [assignment: specially defined IT system event and/or data such as
network packet data] from the IT system resources.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Intrusion detection analysis (FID_IDA)
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for automated means that analyse system activity on
collected system data looking for possible or real intrusions. This analysis may work in
support of intrusion detection, or automatic response to an intrusion.
The actions to be taken based on the detection can be specified using the FID_ARP
family as desired.
In FID_IDA.1 Potential violation analysis, basic threshold detection on the basis of a
rule set is required.
In FID_IDA.2 Simple attack heuristics, the TSF shall be able to detect the occurrence of
signature events that represent a significant intrusion. This search for signature events
occurs in real-time.
In FID_IDA.3 Complex attack heuristics, the TSF shall be able to represent and detect
multi-step intrusion scenarios. The TSF is able to compare system events (possibly
performed by multiple individuals) against event sequences known to represent entire
intrusion scenarios. The TSF shall be able to indicate when a signature event or event
sequence is found that indicates an intrusion.
Management: FID_IDA.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
FID_IDA Intrusion detection analysis 1 2 3
Component levelling:
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a) maintenance of the rules by (adding, modifying, deletion) of rules from the set of
rules.
Management: FID_IDA.2
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the subset of system events.
Management: FID_IDA.3
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the subset of system events;
b) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the set of sequence of system
events.
Audit: FID_IDA.1, FID_IDA.2, FID_IDA.3.
The following actions should be auditable if FID_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms;
b) Automated responses performed by the tool.
c) Other intrusion related information belonging to detected intrusion such as intrusion
type and priority.
FID_IDA.1 Intrusion detection analysis
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FID_IDA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the
collected event data and based upon these rules indicate an intrusion.
FID_IDA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring collected
data:
a) Accumulation or combination of [assignment: subset of defined
collectable event data] known to indicate an intrusion;
b) [assignment: any other rules].
Dependencies: FID_COLLECTION.1 Data collection
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FID_IDA.2 Simple attack heuristics
Hierarchical to: FID_IDA.1
FID_IDA.2.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the
following signature events [assignment: a subset of system events] that may
indicate an intrusion.
FID_IDA.2.2 The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events against the
collected system data discernible from an examination of [assignment: the
information to be used to determine collected system data].
FID_IDA.2.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent intrusion when a
system event is found to match a signature event that indicates an intrusion.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FID_IDA.3 Complex attack heuristics
Hierarchical to: FID_IDA.2
FID_IDA.3.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the
following event sequences of known intrusion scenarios [assignment: list of
sequences of system events whose occurrence are representative of known
penetration scenarios] and the following signature events [assignment: a subset
of system events] that may indicate an intrusion.
FID_IDA.3.2 The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events and event
sequences against the collected system data discernible from an examination of
[assignment: the information to be used to determine collected system data].
FID_IDA.3.3 The TSF shall be able to indicate an imminent intrusion when
system activity is found to match a signature event or event sequence that
indicates an intrusion.
Dependencies: No dependencies
